I 摘要 我国证券市场形成至今，作为证券市场中的重要组成部分——上市公司， 却屡屡传出会计舞弊等丑闻，从郑百文事件、银广夏舞弊到如今的欣泰电气、 万福生科等都给证券市场带来了不小的冲击，也极大损害着中小股东的利益。 财务违规处罚作为一种强有力的规范市场的工具，其在对违反原则的上市公司 及相关人员进行处罚的同时，也是对其他市场参与者的一种警醒。纵观我国目 前的证券监管机制，形成了以中国证监会为代表的行政处罚体系，通过监管体 系的完善，以独立的身份对上市公司进行监督，充分发挥其“公众看门人”的 作用。 基于财务违规而被处罚这样一前提，受处罚的企业会产生怎样的效应？被 处罚后的上市公司其管理层是否会在履职过程中更为勤勉？市场又会如何反 应？企业经营效益会发生怎样的变化？本文基于以上背景，对因财务违规而被 处罚的大智慧股份公司进行研究，全面分析其被处罚的事件过程和原因，并对 其被处罚前后的情况进行分析，从而考证上市公司财务违规处罚的具体效应。 本文在内容上，首先，对国内外有关证券监管制度、上市公司违规行为动 因、财务违规处罚效应的相关文献进行了梳理和总结。其次，结合论文的研究 思路，对声誉理论、政府管制理论、投资者保护理论和市场失灵理论进行了阐 述，证明了以中国证监会为代表的监管机构对财务违规行为作出处罚的必要性。 与此同时，对文章的关键概念进行了界定，以此作为论文内容的内涵和外延。 第三，通过选取我国证券监管机构对上市公司 2010-2018 九年间作出的财务违 处罚情况为样本，对我国上市公司财务违规处罚情况进行描述性统计，了解目 前我国上市公司的财务违规处罚现状；第四，选取因发生财务违规而被处罚的 大智慧股份公司作为案例进行分析，在全面了解大智慧违规事件的过程和违规 手段的基础上，利用相关数据和资料对其违规处罚前后的情况进行详细分析， 主要从以下几个方面展开：（1）运用事件研究法，对调查公告日、违规处罚公摘要 II 告日前后[-30，30]窗口期内的累计超额收益率（CAR）进行计算，根据其波动 幅度确定财务违规处罚带来的市场反应；（2）分析违规处罚前后案例公司管理 层的变动及相关人员的履职情况；（3）分析处罚后管理成本的变化；（4）分 析财务违规处罚后财务报表重述而导致财务信息产生的具体变化以及处罚后公 司经营效益的波动情况，通过以上分析，全面研究财务违规处罚的效应，并根 据分析内容得出相应的结论和对策建议，一方面可以提醒投资者注意受罚企业 后续的变化，谨慎投资，另一方面也为进一步提高我国证券市场的监管水平提 供参考。 研究结果表明：（1）财务违规处罚后市场反应显著为负，特别是在公告日， 具有强烈的负面反应；（2）处罚后公司治理水平有所提高，但独立董事履职依 旧不足；（3）处罚后上市公司的管理成本有所增加；（4）违规公司受处罚当 年经营效益下滑，但财务信息真实性提高。最后，站在上市公司和投资者的角 度，面对上市公司财务违规处罚的效应，提出了相关建议，以帮助上市公司和 投资者更好的规避风险。 关键词：上市公司；财务违规；处罚效应Abstract III Abstract Since the the formation of China's securities market, as an important part of the securities market, the listed companies, there have been repeatedly exposed to accounting fraud scandal, from the ZhengBaiwen event, Yinguangxia fraud to today's xintai electric, Wan Fu Sheng Ke, have brought huge impact to the stock market, this has also greatly damaged the interests of minority shareholders. As a powerful tool to regulate the market, financial penalty is not only a punishment to the listed companies and related personnel who violate the principles, but also a warning to other market participants. Looking at the current securities regulatory mechanism in China, an administrative penalty system has been formed, represented by the CSRC. Through the improvement of the regulatory system, the listed companies are supervised in an independent capacity, giving full play to their role as "public gatekeepers". Based on the premise of being punished for financial irregularities, what is the effect of being punished? Will the management of the listed company be more diligent in performing their duties after being punished? How will the market react? How will the operating efficiency change? Based on the above background, this paper conducts a research on DZH limited which is punished for its financial violation, comprehensively analyzes the process and reasons of its punishment, and analyzes the situation before and after being punished, so as to verify the specific effect of financial violation punishment of listed companies. In terms of content, this paper firstly sorts out and summarizes the domestic and foreign literature on securities regulatory system, motivation of illegal behaviors of listed companies and penalty effect of financial irregularities. Secondly, combining with the research ideas of this paper, this paper expounds the theory of reputation, the theory of government regulation, the theory of investor protection and the theory of market failure, which proves the necessity of the regulatory authorities represented byAbstract IV the CSRC to punish financial irregularities. At the same time, the paper defines the key concepts as the connotation and extension of the paper. Thirdly, by selecting the financial violation penalties of listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as a sample, we can make descriptive statistics on the financial violations and punishments of Listed Companies in China, so as to understand the current financial violation penalties of listed companies in China. Fourth, we can select the DZH companies punished for financial violations as a case for analysis, On the basis of a comprehensive understanding of the process and means of its violations, this paper uses relevant data and materials to conduct a detailed analysis of the situation before and after the violation punishment, mainly from the following several aspects: (1) using the event study method, the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) within the [- 30, 30] window period before and after the investigation announcement date and the violation punishment announcement date is calculated According to the fluctuation range, the market reaction caused by financial violation punishment is determined. (2) analyze the changes in the management of the company and the performance of relevant personnel before and after the punishment; (3) analyze the change of management cost after punishment; (4) analyze the specific changes of the financial information caused by the restatement of the financial statements after the punishment of financial violations and the fluctuation of the company's operating efficiency after the punishment. Through the above analysis, comprehensively study the effect of the punishment of financial violations, and on the one hand, it can remind investors to pay attention to the changes of enterprises after the punishment and invest prudently. On the other hand, it can provide reference for further improving the supervision level of China's securities market. The results show that :(1) the market reaction after the penalty of financial violation is significantly negative, especially on the day of announcement date, which has a strong negative reaction; (2) the corporate governance level has been improvedAbstract V after the punishment, but the performance of independent directors is still insufficient; (3) the management cost of listed companies increases after the punishment. (4) the company's operating profit declined in the current year, but the authenticity of financial information increased. Finally, from the point of view of listed companies and investors, in the face of the effect of financial penalties of listed companies, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions to help listed companies and investors better avoid risks. Keywords: Listed company；Financial irregularities；Effect of punishment目录 VI 目录 摘要 ..... I ABSTRACT ................... III 第一章 绪论 .................. 1 第一节 研究背景及研究意义 ........................... 1 一、研究背景 .... 1 二、研究意义 .... 2 第二节 文献综述 ................... 3 一、证券监管制度文献综述 .......... 3 二、上市公司违规行为动因文献综述 ........................ 4 三、财务违规处罚效应文献综述 . 5 四、文献评述 .... 9 第三节 研究思路和方法 ... 10 一、研究思路 .. 10 二、研究方法 .. 10 第四节 研究内容与框架 ... 11 一、研究内容 .. 11 二、论文框架 .. 12 第五节 论文主要创新点 ... 13 一、选题创新 .. 13 二、研究方法创新 ........................ 14 第二章 财务违规及违规处罚效应理论概述 ................ 15 第一节 相关概念界定 ........ 15 一、处罚主体 .. 15 目录 VII 二、违规处罚的方式 .................... 16 三、违规主体的界定 .................... 17 四、违规行为的界定 .................... 17 五、处罚效应分析 ........................ 18 第二节 理论基础 ................. 18 一、政府管制理论 ........................ 18 二、声誉理论 .. 20 三、投资者保护理论 .................... 21 四、市场失灵理论 ........................ 22 第三章 我国上市公司财务违规处罚现状 ..................... 23 第一节 我国上市公司违规行为统计 ............ 23 一、违规公司情况分布 ................ 23 二、违规类型分布 ........................ 24 第二节 我国上市公司违规处罚实施现状 ... 25 一、监管机构处罚频率分析 ........ 25 二、处罚类型分析 ........................ 27 第四章 大智慧财务违规处罚案例简介 .......................... 28 第一节 案例公司情况简介 .............................. 28 一、大智慧股份公司发展历程 .... 28 二、大智慧股份公司股权结构 .... 29 第二节 大智慧股份公司违规事件概况分析 ............................. 30 一、大智慧股份公司违规事件概况 .......................... 30 二、证监会对大智慧股份的行政处罚结果 .............. 36 第五章 大智慧财务违规处罚效应分析 .......................... 38 第一节 市场反应分析 ........ 38 一、研究设计 .. 38 二、研究结果分析 ........................ 39 目录 VIII 第二节 管理层及相关人员履职情况分析 ... 45 一、高管变更情况 ........................ 45 二、董监高履职情况 .................... 47 第三节 管理成本影响分析 .............................. 50 一、董监高薪酬方面 .................... 50 二、审计费用方面 ........................ 51 第四节 财务报表影响分析 .............................. 52 一、资产负债表方面 .................... 52 二、利润表方面 ............................ 53 三、现金流量表方面 .................... 54 第五节 经营效益影响分析 .............................. 54 一、盈利能力分析 ........................ 54 二、偿债能力分析 ........................ 57 第六章 研究结论与对策建议 .............. 60 第一节 案例研究结论 ........ 60 第二节 对策建议 ................... 第三节 研究局限与展望 ... 64