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MBA毕业论文_府补贴_内部控制质量与企业投资效率PDF

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文本描述
投资是实现企业价值增长的重要途径。在我国政府“简政放权”和产业结构 转型升级的背景下,企业的政治战略与投资行为成为学术界研究的重点之一。企 业的投资行为受到内部和外部环境多方面因素的影响,目前我国资本市场的发 展还不够成熟,监管机制也存在缺陷,因此非效率投资的现象普遍存在。我国经 济体制下政府承担着重要职能,对企业的投资活动也发挥着重要的引导作用。在 这样的背景下,研究政府补贴对投资效率的影响具有较强的理论与现实意义。 本文在结合委托代理理论、信息不对称理论以及公共财政理论三大理论的 基础上,研究政府补贴对企业投资效率的作用效果,通过对政府补贴、内部控制 质量和投资效率三者的内在机理进行分析,阐述引入内部控制质量这一调节变 量的合理性,并提出本文的研究假设。本文最后引入外部治理因素——产品市场 竞争程度,进一步丰富了本文结论。本文选取我国 A 股上市企业符合条件的 2014-2018年间共 8323个有效观测样本,通过对全样本、分样本描述性统计以 及相关性分析后,根据面板数据建立多元回归模型进行回归分析。实证的研究表 明:(1)政府补贴与非效率投资成正相关,即政府补贴加剧了 A股上市企业的 非效率投资;对样本进一步分组回归发现,政府补贴对投资效率的作用效果具有 异质性。(2)高质量的内部控制对非效率投资有显著的抑制作用,既可以有效缓 解A股上市企业的投资不足,也可以抑制其过度投资。(3)内部控制质量在政 府补贴与企业投资效率的关系中具有调节作用。(4)高产品市场竞争的企业,政 府补贴缓解投资不足的作用更显著;低产品市场竞争的企业,政府补贴反而会加 剧其过度投资。产品市场的竞争程度作为外部调节机制,对政府补贴的配置效率 具有一定的监督和治理作用。 本文基于新的视角探讨了政府补贴在企业投资效率、投资不足和过度投资 中的作用效果,分别检验了内部控制质量、产品市场竞争的调节作用。本文的研 究为进一步完善补贴分配机制,实现补贴资源的有效性提供了理论依据。最后本 文从补贴分配机制,内部控制建设和产品市场竞争等几个方面提出相关建议供 政府部门和企业制定者参考。 关键词:投资效率,政府补贴,内部控制质量,产品市场竞争 II Abstract Investment is an important way to realize enterprise value growth. Under the background of "simplifying administration and delegating power" and the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure, the political strategy and investment behavior of enterprises have become one of the focuses of academic research. The investment behavior of enterprises is affected by many factors of internal and external environment. At present, the development of China's capital market is not mature enough, and there are defects in the regulatory mechanism, so the phenomenon of inefficient investment is widespread. Under China's economic system, the government plays an important role in guiding the investment activities of enterprises. In this context, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the impact of government subsidies on investment efficiency. On the basis of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and public finance theory, this thesis studies the effect of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of enterprises. By analyzing the internal mechanism of government subsidies, internal control quality and investment efficiency, this thesis expounds the rationality of introducing internal control quality as a regulating variable, and puts forward the false research of this paper Set. At the end of this paper, the external governance factor - product market competition degree is introduced, which further enriches the conclusion of this thesis. In this paper, 8323 effective observation samples of Chinese A-share listed companies during 2014-2018 are selected. After descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of the whole sample and sub sample, multiple regression models are established based on panel data for regression analysis. The empirical research shows that: (1) the government subsidy is positively related to the inefficient investment, that is, the government subsidy intensifies the inefficient investment of A- share listed companies; further grouping regression of the samples shows that the effect of government subsidy on the investment efficiency is heterogeneous. (2) High quality internal control has a significant inhibitory effect on inefficient investment, which can not only effectively alleviate the investment shortage of A-share listed companies, but also inhibit their over investment. (3) The quality of internal control plays a regulatory role in the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise investment III efficiency. (4) The government subsidy plays a more significant role in alleviating the underinvestment of the enterprises competing in the high product market, while the government subsidy will aggravate the over investment of the enterprises competing in the low product market. The competition degree of product market, as an external regulation mechanism, plays a certain role in supervising and governing the allocation efficiency of government subsidies. Based on a new perspective, this thesis discusses the effect of government subsidies on investment efficiency, under investment and over investment of enterprises, and tests the regulatory effects of internal control quality and product market competition. This study provides a theoretical basis for further improving the mechanism of subsidy allocation and realizing the effectiveness of subsidy resources. Finally, this thesis puts forward some suggestions from the aspects of subsidy distribution mechanism, internal control construction and product market competition for the reference of government departments and enterprise makers. Keywords: Investment Efficiency, Government Subsidies, Internal Control Quality, Product Market Competition IV 目录 摘要 ............................................................. I Abstract ...................................................................................................................... II 第1章 绪论 ........................................................ 1 1.1 研究背景和意义 ............................................................................................. 1 1.1.1 研究背景 ............................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 研究意义 ............................................................................................... 2 1.2 国内外研究综述 ............................................................................................. 3 1.2.1 投资效率的相关文献 ........................................................................... 3 1.2.2 政府补贴与投资效率的相关文献 ....................................................... 7 1.2.3 内部控制质量与投资效率的相关文献 ............................................... 9 1.2.4 文献评述 ............................................................................................. 10 1.3 研究内容与研究方法 ................................................................................... 11 1.3.1 研究内容 ............................................................................................. 11 1.3.2 研究方法 ............................................................................................. 12 第2章 相关概念与理论基础 ......................................... 14 2.1 相关概念 ....................................................................................................... 14 2.1.1 政府补贴 ............................................................................................. 14 2.1.2 内部控制质量 ..................................................................................... 14 2.1.3 投资效率 ............................................................................................. 15 2.2 理论基础 ....................................................................................................... 16 2.2.1 信息不对称理论 ................................................................................. 16 2.2.2 委托代理理论 ..................................................................................... 16 2.2.3 公共财政理论 ..................................................................................... 17 2.3 政府补贴、内部控制质量与投