城投债，又称“准市政债”，近年来是城投公司融资的主要品种和选择。城 投债的发行利率即城投公司的融资成本问题，一直是困扰学术界的一个领域。城 投公司一方面由于其天然的承担较多政府代建的功能，且在企业经营上更多的是 从事基础设施建设、公益事业投资、园林绿化投入等项目；另一方面是企业的还 款来源是基于投资项目的回款及政府的补贴。城投企业可能在账面资金极为不充 沛的情况下却能偿还大量的负债。例如16湘九华，发行人湘潭九华经济建设投 资有限公司在兑付前公司账面资金仅有2100万元，却能一次性兑付20亿元的债 券。 城投债固然是有一定特殊性的，但是其真实融资成本确实是一个值得深究的 领域，那么到底是哪些因素影响了城投企业的实际融资成本呢？本文从城投公司 背书人地方政府的角度，通过研究地方政府隐性担保能力和城投债信用利差之间 的关系，试图来解答这一疑题。在此基础上，研究引入城投债主承销商类别、市 场化指数以及发行制度等三个调节变量，验证不同情境下地方政府隐性担保能力 和城投债信用利差之间的关系。 本文使用实证研究的方式，通过万得数据库统计2018年所新发的所有城投 类企业债，其中筛掉评级在AA-以下的主体，共计得到样本债券282只。本文对 这282只债券进行描述性统计及多元回归，从而验证地方隐性担保能力和城投债 信用利差之间的关系，以及主承销商类别、市场化指数和发行制度的调节作用。 研究发现，地方政府隐性担保能力对城投债信用利差的确实会产生显著负向作用。 地方政府的隐性担保能力越强，城投债信用利差会越小。研究加入主承销商级别 作为调节变量，发现头部券商或其他券商牵头的债券融资项目，其对政府隐性担 保能力影响城投发行利差的程度有调节作用。头部券商作为城投债主承销商时， 地方政府隐性担保对发行利差的负向影响会削弱；其他券商作为城投债主承销商 的，地方政府隐性担保能力对发行利差的负向影响会显著增强。研究加入市场化 指数作为调节变量，发现市场化指数会调节地方政府隐性担保能力和信用利差之 间的关系。较高的市场化指数下，地方政府隐性担保能力对城投债发行利差的负 向影响越小；较低的市场化指数下，地方政府隐性担保能力对城投债发行利差的 负向影响越大。研究加入发行制度作为调节变量，发现发行制度同样对地方政府 隐性担保能力和城投债发行利差之间的关系产生调节作用。注册制下的城投债， 由于其发行门槛较低，会增强地方政府隐性担保能力对城投债发行利差之间的关 系；审核制下的城投债，由于其发行门槛较高，会削弱地方政府隐性担保能力对 城投债发行利差之间的关系。 研究从政府的角度，选择影响城投债利差的重要因素地方政府隐性担保能力 作为解释变量，对城投债利差的研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。从理论上讲， 之前关于城投债利差的文献大多聚焦于债券本身和债券发行方，本文将城投债的 间接背书人地方政府引入模型中，研究地方政府的隐性担保能力对城投债利差的 影响，丰富了城投债的相关研究。在主效应基础上，研究还将主承销商级别、市 场化指数、发行制度等三个变量引入模型，研究其对地方政府隐性担保能力和城 投债利差之间的调节作用，完善了地方政府和城投债研究模型。 从实践上讲，论文验证了城投债发行政府的隐性担保能力和发行利差之间的 负向关系。地方政府为了降低融资成本，需要加强自身隐性担保能力，为城投债 信用进行背书。具体而言，地方政府在城投债发行之前可以着重增强其公共预算， 降低城投债违约风险。此外，从主承销商类别、市场化指数以及发行制度上着手， 城投债发行方可以降低地方政府隐性担保能力对发行利差的影响。首先，城投债 发行方可以选择级别较高的头部承销商作为主承销商进行债券发行，提高城投债 的信用，降低市场违约预期，进而确保地方政府隐性担保能力不足的情况下，城 投债的融资成本处于较低水平。其次，从市场化指数来讲，尽管地方政府无力改 变城市融资市场化程度，却可以通过城投债披露制度，增加市场透明度，提升投 资人信心，进而降低城投债信用利差，减少融资成本。最后，从发行制度上讲， 尽管审核制需要更长的融资时间，城投债发行方仍然需要尽可能选择更为严格的 审核制，从而利用制度优势抵消其隐性担保能力对发行利差的负向作用。事实上， 金融市场上，城投债发行方也越来越倾向于选择审核制作为发行机制。 尽管研究具有很强的理论和实践意义，囿于数据和时间，论文仍然有进一步 研究的空间。从理论模型上讲，尽管研究探究了被解释变量地方政府隐性担保能 力和城投债发行利差之间的关系，模型没有讨论二者的内在机制。从数据上讲， 论文沿用了前人测量变量的方式，具有一定的科学性，但是对于同一变量，前人 有不同的测量方式，不同方式之间的区别仍有待研究。从数学模型构建上，研究 仍然有忽略的控制变量，未来研究可以考虑。 关键词：地方政府隐性担保能力，城投债，信用利差，主承销商类别，市场化指数 TITLE The Study on the Effect of Local Govenments’ Implicit Guarantee Capacity on Interest Spreads of Quasi-Municipal Bonds ABSTRACT Urban investment bond, also known as "quasi-municipal bond", is the main variety and choice of urban investment company financing in recent years. The interest rate of urban investment bond also known as the financing cost of urban investment bank, is the iuuse that really perplex the academia. On the one hand, urban investment corporation naturally undertakes a lot of functions of government construction. On the other hand, urban investment corporation mainly engages in infrastructure construction, public welfare investment, landscaping investment and other projects. On the other hand, repayment sources of enterprises are based on the collection of investment projects and government subsidies. Urban investment enterprises may have little equity capital on their accounts but they can repay so much more debt. For example, 16 xiangtan jiuhua construction and investment co. LTD. the issuer had only 21 million yuan of equity capital before it was redeemed, but it could redeem 2 billion yuan of credit bonds in one time. Of course, municipal bond has certain particularity, but its real financing cost is a field worthy of in-depth study. What factors affect the actual financing cost of municipal bond? From the point of view of the endorser of urban investment corporation, this study tries to solve this problem by exploring the relationship between the implicit guarantee capacity of local government and the credit spread of urban investment corporation. On this basis, three moderating variables including the category of underwriters of urban investment creditors, marketization index and issuance system were studied to verify the relationship between the implicit guarantee capacity of local governments and the credit spread of urban investment bank under different circumstances. In this paper, all new urban investment enterprise bonds issued in 2018 were counted by means of empirical research through wind access database. Among them, subjects with rating below aa-minus were screened out, and a total of 270 sample bonds were obtained. This paper conducts descriptive statistics and multiple regression on these 270 bonds, so as to verify the relationship between local implicit guarantee capacity and credit spread of municipal bonds, as well as the regulating role of main underwriter category, marketization index and issuance system.It is found that the implicit guarantee ability of local governments does have a significant negative effect on the credit municipal bonds. The stronger the implicit guarantee ability of local governments is, the smaller the credit spreads of municipal bonds will be. The study added the level of lead underwriter as a regulating variable, and found that the bond financing projects led by head securities firms or other securities firms had a regulating effect on the extent to which the implicit guarantee ability of the government affected the spread of urban investment bank. When the head broker ACTS as the underwriter of the city investment creditor, the negative influence of the implicit guarantee of the local government on the issuance spread will be weakened. As underwriters of urban investment bank creditors, the implicit guarantee ability of local governments will significantly increase the negative impact on issuance spreads. The research adds the marketization index as the regulating variable and finds that the marketization index will regulate the relationship between the implicit guarantee ability of local government and the credit spread. With a higher marketization index, the negative influence of the implicit guarantee ability of local governments on the spread of urban investment bonds is smaller. With a low marketization index, the implicit guarantee ability of local governments has a greater negative impact on the spread of urban investment bonds. This paper studies the addition of issuanc