首先，本文梳理了国内外有关R&D投入强度与企业绩效关系、高管激励对两者关
系影响的相关文献，阐述了本文的研究思路与研究方法；其次，对R&D投入强度、企
业绩效、高管激励等相关概念予以界定；基于技术创新理论与委托代理理论阐述了R&D
投入强度对企业绩效作用过程，分析激励机制可能对该过程产生的影响；在此基础上，
结合制造业企业实际情况，提出了本文的研究假设；利用分层回归方法与分组回归方法
检验了R&D投入强度对企业绩效的影响，检验高管激励机制对两者关系的调节效应，
对实证结果予以讨论与分析。最后，对研究过程进行总结并提出相关政策建议，指出研
究中尚存的不足之处及未来研究展望
本文主要得出以下结论：R&D投入强度与当期企业绩效为负相关关系，且R&D投
入强度对企业绩效的影响存在滞后效应，两者关系在滞后期内出现由负转正的趋势，该
滞后效应至少存在三期，且该滞后影响呈现出倒“V”型发展态势，最佳滞后期为两年；
高管薪酬激励和股权激励对R&D投入强度与当期企业绩效的关系均具有调节作用，通
过实施高管激励手段可以改善R&D投入强度与当期企业绩效的负相关关系；从调节变
量性质上来看，高管薪酬激励为半调节变量，高管股权激励为纯调节变量；企业实际控
制人性质不同，高管激励的调节效应也存在差异。在非国有控股企业中，高管薪酬激励
与高管股权激励均能够调节R&D投入强度与当期企业绩效的关系，改善R&D投入强
度与企业绩效的负相关关系。但在国有控股企业中，高管薪酬激励与高管股权激励对
R&D投入强度与企业绩效关系的调节效应并不显著。最后，结合研究结论对优化高管
激励制度以提升企业研发投入绩效提出一些政策与建议
关键词：R&D投入强度；企业绩效；薪酬激励；股权激励；调节效应
Abstract
II
Abstract
The233listedcompaniesinChina'smanufacturinglistedcompanieswhichdisclose
R&Dinvestmentintensityandexecutiveincentivedatafor2011-2016hadbeentakenasthe
researchsample;the2011-2016periodshavebeenusedasaresearchsampletotestthe
relationshipbetweenR&Dinvestmentintensityandfirmperformance(ROE)relationshipand
whethertheexecutiveincentivesregulatetherelationshipbetweentheR&Dandfirm
performance;onthisbasis,accordingtothedifferentnatureoftheactualcontroller,the
sampleisdividedintotwosub-sampleswhicharestate-controlledenterprisesand
non-state-controlledenterprises,thenthispapertestswhethertheregulatoryeffectonthe
relationshipbetweenR&Dinvestmentintensityandfirmperformanceisdifferentamong
enterpriseswithdifferentownershiptypes.
Firstofall,thispaperreviewsrelevantliteratureabouttherelationshipbetweenR&D
investmentintensityandfirmperformance,andtheinfluenceofexecutiveincentiveonthe
relationshipbetweenthetwo.Onthebasisofthis,thispaperformstheresearchideasand
researchmethods.Secondly,thispaperdefinestherelatedconceptsofR&Dinvestment
intensity,corporateperformanceandexecutiveincentive.Basedonthetheoryof
technologicalinnovationandprincipal-agenttheory,theprocessoftheR&Dinvestment
intensityonfirmperformanceisexplained,andtheincentivemechanismmayimprovethe
relationshipbetweenR&Dinvestmentintensityandfirmperformance.Onthebasisofthese
analysis,thispaperputforwardtheresearchhypotheses.Then,byusingthemethodof
stratifiedregressionandgroupregression,thispaperteststheimpactofR&Dinvestment
intensityonfirmperformanceandtheregulatoryeffectofexecutiveincentivemechanismon
therelationshipbetweenthetwo,anddiscussestheempiricalresults.Finally,thepaperputs
forwardtherelevantpolicysuggestionsandpointsouttheextantdeficienciesintheresearch
andthefutureresearchprospects.
Themainconclusionsofthispaperareasfollows:therelationshipbetweenR&Dand
currentcorporateperformanceisnegativelycorrelated,andtheimpactofR&Doncorporate
performancehasalaggedeffect.Theexecutivecompensationincentiveandtheexecutive
stockoptionincentivehaveapositiveeffectontherelationshipbetweentheR&Dinvestment
intensityandtheenterpriseperformance.Fromthenatureoftheadjustmentvariable,the
executivecompensationincentiveisasemi-adjustedvariable,andinthenon-state-controlled
enterprises,executivecompensationincentiveandexecutivestockoptionincentivecanboth
positivelyregulatetherelationshipbetweenR&Dandfirmperformance.However,in
state-controlledenterprises,theeffectofexecutivecompensationincentiveandexecutive
stockoptionincentiveontherelationshipbetweenR&Dinvestmentintensityandfirm
performanceisnotsignificant.Finally,basedontheresearchconclusions,somepoliciesand
suggestionsareputforwardtooptimizetheincentivesystemofseniorexecutiveswhichcan
improvetherelationshipbetweenR&Dandcorporateperformance.
Keywords:R&DInvestmentintensity;EnterprisePerformance;Compensation
incentive;Equityincentive;ModeratingFunction
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