摘要
2012 年 11 月至 2013 年 12 月，我国资本市场 IPO 停闸持续了一
年有余，并购取代 IPO 成为私募股权投资基金（Private Equity，PE）
的最佳退出通道。与此同时，以黑石资本、KKR 为代表的海外大型 PE
进军中国市场，短时间内频繁开展大规模的并购，赚取了高额回报

在多种因素的共同刺激下，并购基金开始成为资本市场的宠儿。近年
来国家决策层大力度调整产业结构、促进过剩产能的消化，金融市场
可与配套的金融工具种类有限，职业经理人市场尚不成熟。在这种生
存土壤下，国外的以 PE 为主导的并购基金模式并不完全适用于中国
本土市场环境，反而催生了一类新兴模式的并购基金—“PE+上市公
司”模式的并购基金

2011 年，上市公司大康牧业与 PE 天堂硅谷共同出资设立了我国
首支“上市公司+PE”模式的并购基金—长沙天堂硅谷大康股权投资
合伙企业（下称“天堂大康”）。2015 年 10 月，天堂硅谷旗下子公
司因股权纠纷起诉大康牧业，宣告我国首例上“上市公司+PE”模式
的并购基金出现合作危机。尽管最终双方达成了和解并未诉诸公堂，
但对正在或者未来有意向设立类似并购基金的上市公司和 PE 敲响了
警钟，也让人们看到了这种模式的并购基金在双赢外观之下潜藏的巨
大风险

本文首先介绍了论文选题的背景与意义、研究思路、对我国并购
基金发展情况及和风险管理研究作了系统总结并对已有的研究成果
进行评述。其次阐述了与本文研究相关的三个理论，分别是协同效应
理论、委托代理理论与风险管理理论，以此作为后文理论分析工具

此后，本文介绍了我国并购基金的设立背景、主要的三种模式，在此
基础上着重介绍了“上市公司+PE”模式并购基金的设立动机、运营
模式及不同环节的主要风险点，进而提出了“上市公司+PE”模式并II
购基金风险管理这一命题。再次，本文以天堂大康基金作为典型案例，
在介绍设立动机和运作模式的基础上，结合其历次并购披露的文件，
分析了其运营过程中存在的风险和原因。研究发现，这一模式并购基
金的典型风险主要包括上市公司与 PE 定位模糊、盈利模式设计不够
完善、投后管理权责不明、项目退出渠道单一和法律监管滞后。在研
究的基础上，本文有针对性的提出了多渠道缓解委托代理问题、科学
设计基金架构、后续管理权责清晰、丰富基金退出渠道以及完善私募
基金监管体系的风险防范建议并总结全文，对未来研究方向进行了展
望

关键词：并购基金，风险管理，委托代理风险III
RISKANALYSIS OF “LISTED COMPANIES +PE”
MODE OF BUYOUT FUNDS
Abstract
From November 2012 to December 2013, China&39;s capital market IPO stop for more
than a year, mergers and acquisitions on behalf of the IPO as a private equity fund
(Private Equity, PE) the best exit channel. At the same time, with Blackstone Capital,
KKR as the representative of the overseas large-scale PE into the Chinese market, a
short time to carry out large-scale mergers and acquisitions, earn high returns. Under
the common stimulation of many factors, M & A fund began to become the darling of
the capital market. In recent years, the national policy-making efforts to adjust the
industrial structure, and promote the digestion of excess capacity, the financial market
can be associated with limited types of financial instruments, professional managers
market is not yet mature. In this living environment, the foreign PE-oriented M & A
fund model is not fully applicable to the Chinese domestic market environment, but
gave birth to a new type of mergers and acquisitions fund - PE + listed companies
model of M & A Fund.
In 2011, the listed company Dakang Animal Husbandry and PE Paradise Silicon
Valley jointly set up China&39;s first listed company + PE model of mergers and
acquisitions fund - Changsha Paradise Silicon Valley Da Kang equity investment
partnership (hereinafter referred to as paradise). In October 2015, a subsidiary of
Silicon Valley Paradise, a subsidiary of equity suits Dakang animal husbandry,
declared the first case of listed companies + PE mode of mergers and acquisitions
fund a crisis of cooperation. Although the two sides reached a settlement did not resort
to the court, but is in the future or the intention to set up similar M & A funds listed
companies and PE sounded the alarm, but also let people see this model of mergers
and acquisitions under the hidden look of the fund hidden Of the huge risk.
This paper first introduces the background and significance of the topic selection,
research ideas, the development of China&39;s M & A Fund and risk management
research and made a systematic summary of the existing research results are reviewed.
Secondly, it elaborates three theories related to this study, namely, the theory of
synergistic effect, principal-agent theory and risk management theory, which is used
as the theoretical analysis tool. After that, this paper introduces the establishment
background and the main three models of the M & A fund in China. On this basis, it
introduces the establishment motive, operation mode and the main risk points of the
M & A fund of listed company + PE mode, The listed companies + PE mode ofIV
mergers and acquisitions fund risk management proposition. Thirdly, on the basis of
introducing the motive and operation model, this paper analyzes the risks and reasons
in the operation process of the Paradise Dakang Fund as a typical case. The study
finds that the typical risks of M & A funds include the ambiguity of the listed
companies and PE, the imperfect profit model design, unclear management rights and
responsibilities, the single project exit channel and the lag of legal supervision. On the
basis of the study, this paper puts forward the multi-channel mitigation principal-agent
problem, scientifically designs the fund structure, clarifies the follow-up management
responsibility, enriches the exit channel of the fund and perfects the risk prevention
suggestion of the private fund supervision system. The future research direction is
forecasted.
KEY WORDS：Buyout funds，Risk Management，Principal-agent Risk浙江工业大学硕士学位论文 “上市公司+PE”模式并购基金的风险分析
V
目 录
1 绪论 ..1
1.1 研究背景及意义 ..........1
1.1.1 研究背景...........1
1.1.2 研究意义...........2
1.2 国内外研究综述 ..........2
1.2.1 国外研究综述.......2
1.2.2 国内研究综述.......3
1.3 研究框架、方法及创新点 ..5
1.3.1 研究框架...........5
1.3.2 研究方法...........6
1.3.3 创新点.7
2 理论基础 ..........9
2.1 协同效应理论 9
2.2 委托代理理论 ...........10
2.3 风险管理理论 ...........11
3 我国上市公司设立并购基金概述 .. 13
3.1 我国并购基金的发展概述 .13
3.2 “上市公司+PE”模式并购基金简介 ....15
3.2.1 “上市公司+PE”模式并购基金的设立动机.....16
3.2.2 “上市公司+PE”模式并购基金的运营模式.....17
3.3 “上市公司+PE”模式并购基金的风险 ..19
3.3.1 基金募集设立环节的风险........19
3.3.2 基金投资环节的风险20
3.3.3 基金投后管理环节的风险........20
3.3.4 基金退出环节的风险21
4 天堂大康案例分析 . 23
4.1 天堂大康并购基金简介 ...23
4.2 天堂大康的运营模式 .....24
4.2.1 天堂大康并购基金的设立动机....24
4.2.2 天堂大康并购基金的设立模式....25
4.3 大康牧业设立私募基金风险管理中存在的问题 .......26
4.3.1 LP 与 GP 关系错位，法律权责失衡 26
4.3.2 盈利模式存在缺陷..27浙江工业大学硕士学位论文 “上市公司+PE”模式并购基金的风险分析
VI
4.3.3 投后管理权责不明..28
4.3.4 退出渠道单一抗风险能力不足....29
4.3.5 法律监管滞后埋下隐患..........31
5 上市公司设立并购基金的风险防范建议 ........ 33
5.1 多渠道缓解委托代理问题 .33
5.2 科学设计基金架构 .......33
5.3 后续管理应当权责清晰 ...34
5.4 构建多层次基金退出渠道 .35
5.5 完善私募基金监管体系 ...35
6 总结 . 37
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