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本文基于利他理论和代理理论，对国内外家族企业实际控制人的利他行为与
代理成本关系的研究进行全面综述。在此基础上，本文假设企业实际控制人的利
他行为对代理成本的影响与企业发展阶段有关。通过改良演化生物学的 Hamilton
亲缘系数衡量家族企业利他行为水平，从家族企业的组织规模、盈利水平和所有
权结构三个维度来划分家族企业的发展阶段，根据衡量代理成本的侧重点不同从
代理费用和代理效率两个维度度量家族企业的代理成本
本文以 2003-2014 年的 A 股家族上市公司为研究对象，实证检验在不同的家
族企业发展阶段，家族企业实际控制人的亲缘利他行为对家族企业代理成本的影
响。实证研究发现：(1)随着家族企业内部组织规模的扩张和盈利水平的提高，
家族企业实际控制人的利他行为会持续降低代理费用并提高代理效率。但是，针
对度量代理成本的不同维度，利他行为对代理成本的积极影响的变化趋势不同
(2)在单一股东控股阶段和兄弟合伙阶段，家族企业实际控制人的利他行为会显
著降低代理费用，提高代理效率；在家族合伙阶段，家族企业实际控制人的利他
行为会显著降低代理费用，但是会降低代理效率。并且，针对度量代理成本的不
同维度，家族企业所有权结构的发展对利他行为与代理成本之间关系的影响趋势
不同。(3)在家族合伙阶段，家族企业选用职业经理人会促进利他行为降低代理
费用，同时会促进利他行为提高代理效率。本文结合家族企业的特殊性，对实证
结果进行诠释，并提出相关理论和政策建议，为我国家族上市企业在发展的不同
阶段控制代理费用提高代理效率提供了一定的借鉴价值和意义
关键词：家族企业，亲缘利他行为，代理成本III
ABSTRACT
In China, the family business is an important part of private economy, which are
the important force in the growth of the national economy. It’s essential to promote
sustainable development of the family firms. The most apparent characteristic of the
principal-agent relationship between the actual controllers and the family managers in
family business is embedded by the kin altruistic behavior. In the academic, many
researchers have focused on the topic that the kin altruistic behavior of actual
controllers may have a dynamic effect on agency cost of the family firms. However,
the measuring method of family firm growth needs to be optimized, and the
granularity of family firm agency cost needs to be refined.
Based on altruism theory and agency theory and according to domestic and
foreign literature, we summarize the relationship between kin altruistic behavior of
the actual controller and agency cost of family firms. On this basis, we assume that
the impact of kin altruistic behavior of the actual controller on agency costs relates to
the enterprise development stage. By introducing the improved Hamilton genetic
coefficient, we measure the level of kin altruistic behavior of the actual controller.
From the scale of the organization, the level of profitability, and the structure of
ownership, we measure the development stage of the family firms. And according to
different emphases, we measure the agency cost of the family firms with two different
aspects, agency expenses and agency efficiency.
With 239 A-share listed family enterprises’ data from 2003 to 2014 as samples,
we study the influence of the kin altruistic behavior on agency cost in different
enterprise development stages, and find that : 1) With the expansion of the scale of
family business and the improvement of the level of profitability, the kin altruistic
behavior can continue to reduce agency expenses and improve the efficiency of
agency. However, in view of the different dimensions of agency cost, the marginal
effects of positive effects are different. 2) In the controlling owner stage and the
siblings stage, the kin altruistic behavior of the actual controller can significantly
reduce agency expenses, and improve agency efficiency; In the extended family of
cousins stage, the kin altruistic behavior of the actual controller of family enterprises
can significantly reduce the agency expenses, but reduce the agency efficiency. And,IV
in view of the different dimensions of agency cost, the development of the ownership
structure of the family business has different influences of the relationship between
the kin altruism behavior and the agency cost. 3)In the extended family of cousins
stage, choosing the professional manager can promote the kin altruistic behavior to
reduce the agency expenses, simultaneously raise the agency efficiency. Based on the
particularity of the family firm, this paper explains the empirical results and puts
forward the relevant theories and policy suggestions. It provides some theoretical
guidance and inspiration for the family listed companies to control the agency
expenses and improve the agency efficiency at different development stages.
KEY WORDS：Family Firms, Kin Altruistic Behavior, Agency CostsV
目 录
摘要....I
ABSTRACT ...III
第 1 章 绪论......1
1.1 研究背景........1
1.2 研究目的和研究意义2
1.2.1 研究目的.........2
1.2.2 研究意义.........3
1.3 研究内容和研究方法4
1.3.1 研究内容.........4
1.3.2 研究方法.........4
1.4 本文的创新点5
1.5 研究框架........6
1.6 本章小结........7
第 2 章 文献综述..........9
2.1 关于家族企业代理理论的研究........9
2.2 关于利他行为理论的研究..10
2.3 关于家族企业利他行为与代理成本关系的研究..10
2.3.1 家族企业利他行为对降低代理成本的积极效应...10
2.3.2 家族企业利他行为对降低代理成本的消极效应...11
2.3.3 家族企业利他行为对代理成本的动态影响...........12
2.3.4 其他关于家族企业利他行为与代理成本关系的研究.......12
2.4 文献评述......13
第 3 章 研究设计........15
3.1 理论分析与研究假设..........15
3.1.1 利他行为、员工人数与代理成本...15
3.1.2 利他行为、公司盈利与代理成本...16
3.1.3 利他行为、所有权发展阶段与代理成本...17
3.2 样本选取及数据来源..........19
3.3 变量选取......19
3.3.1 利他行为指标.
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