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MBA毕业论文_募股权投资对我国创业板公司治理的影响PDF

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文本描述
随着全球经济的发展,私募股权投资发展如火如荼。私募也逐渐成为 我国企业融资的方式之一。本文计划用独立董事占比、股权集中度、监事 会人数对数和高管薪酬敏感度作为公司治理的代理变量;用私募股权投资 是否介入公司0-1变量和私募股权投资持股比例作为自变量的代理变量来 探索私募股权投资对制造业公司治理的影响及其作用机制。本文在实证检 验中,对各个变量进行了相关性检验和膨胀因子检验来克服多重共线性问 题。实证结果显示,私募股权投资持股与独立董事占比、监事会规模以及 高管薪酬敏感度正相关,但与股权集中度的影响不显著,这一结果在小规 模企业和民营企业中更为显著。这表明私募股权投资可以提高制造业的独 立董事占比、扩大监事会规模和刺激其高管薪酬敏感度的提高。进而说明 其对制造业上市公司治理具有积极的作用。为保证结果的稳健性,本文做 了内生性检验和稳健性检验,本文采取固定效应模型来解决内生性问题, 通过替换被解释变量、解释变量和控制变量来进行稳健性检验,得到的结 果与主回归结果一致。 本文证实了私募股权投资可以通过委派独立董事、监事、提高高管薪 酬敏感性等措施,提高被投企业的公司治理质量,规范被投企业的治理结 构,使得制造业企业和私募股权实现双赢。本文的研究为私募股权投资在 制造业该领域的发展以及对制造业该领域的公司治理提供了经验证据。 II 关键词:私募股权投资 公司治理 独立董事占比 监事会规模 高管薪 酬敏感度 III THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT ON GEM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA ——BASED ON MANUFACTURING COMPANY DATA ABSTRACT With the development of the global economy, the development of private equity investment is in full swing. Private equity has gradually become one of the financing methods for Chinese enterprises. This article plans to use the proportion of independent directors, the concentration of equity, the logarithm of the number of supervisors and the sensitivity of executive compensation as proxy variables of corporate governance; whether private equity investment is involved in the company 0-1 variable and the proportion of private equity investment holdings as independent variables To explore the impact of private equity investment on manufacturing corporate governance and its mechanism. In the empirical test in this paper, the correlation test and expansion factor test are carried out on each variable to overcome the problem of multicollinearity. Empirical results show that private equity investment holdings are positively correlated with the proportion of independent directors, the size of the board of supervisors, and the sensitivity of executive compensation, but the impact on equity concentration is not significant. This result is more significant in small-scale companies and private companies . This shows that private equity investment can increase the proportion of independent directors in the manufacturing industry, expand the size of the supervisory board, and stimulate the sensitivity of its executive compensation. Furthermore, it shows that it has a positive effect on the governance of listed manufacturing companies. In order to ensure the robustness of the results, this paper has done endogeneity testing and robustness testing. This paper adopts a fixed-effect model to solve the problem of endogeneity, and conducts robustness testing by replacing the explained variables, explanatory variables and control variables. The results obtained are consistent with The main regression results are consistent. IV This article confirms that private equity investment can improve the quality of corporate governance of invested companies and standardize the governance structure of invested companies by appointing independent directors, supervisors, and improving executive compensation sensitivity, so that manufacturing companies and private equity can achieve a win-win situation. The research in this article provides empirical evidence for the development of private equity investment in this field of manufacturing and corporate governance in this field of manufacturing. KEY WORDS: private equity investment;corporate governance;proportion of independent directors;board of supervisors;executive compensation sensitivity V 目 录 摘要 ............................................................................. I ABSTRACT ......................................................................... III 第一章 绪论 ........................................................................ 1 1.1研究背景 ................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2研究目的和意义 ....................................................................................................................................... 1 1.3论文框架和研究方法 ............................................................................................................................... 2 1.3.1论文框架................................................................................................................................................ 2 1.3.2研究方法................................................................................................................................................ 3 1.4国内外文献综述 ....................................................................................................................................... 4 1.4.1国外研究综述 ........................................................................................................................................ 4 1.4.2国内研究综述 ........................................................................................................................................ 4 1.5创新点 ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 第二章 私募股权基金与公司治理相关理论研究 .......................................... 6 2.1私募股权基金理论研究 ........................................................................................................................... 6 2.2公司治理基本理论 ................................................................................................................................... 6 2.2.1公司治理行为的内涵 ............................................................................................................................ 6 2.2.2信息不对称、委托代理与利益相关者理论 ........................................................................................ 7 2.3私募股权投资参与公司治理的动因 ....................................................................................................... 7 2.3.1降低信息不对称程度 ............................................................................................................................ 7 2.3.2获取高额回报 ........................................................................................................................................ 8 2.4私募股权投资与公司治理的机理与研究假设 ....................................................................................... 8 第三章 私募股权基金与制造业公司治理的现状分析 ..................................... 10 3.1私募股权基金的发展现状 ..................................................................................................................... 10 3.1.1募资现状.............................................................................................................................................. 10 3.1.2投资现状.............................................................................................................................................. 11 3.1.3私募投资上市企业的行业分布 .......................................................................................................... 12 3.1.4私募投资市场 ...................................................................................................................................... 13 3.2制造业上市企业公司治理现状 ............................................................................................................. 14 3.2.1公司董事会结构 .............................................................