i 摘要 证监会公布上市公司员工持股计划指导意见，鼓励上市公司实施此计划， 将员工利益与股东利益相结合，并以此激励员工与企业荣辱与共。据统计，从 2014年1月至2017年8月，截至2017年8月17日，已有320家公司实施员 工持股计划。 本文研究的问题是员工持股计划，具有福利性质，没有激励作用。长期结果 会导致经营绩效的下降和股东财富的减少。 研究发现：（1）员工持股计划具有福利性质、没有激励作用；（2）管理层会 利用控制员工持股计划方案的设定，转移股东权益给员工，以讨好员工，从而减 轻管理压力；（3）在公司内部治理机制不完善的情况下，福利性员工持股计划的 长期的结果，会导致经营绩效的下降和股东财富的减少。研究思路本文以法国施 耐德电气的员工持股计划为例，通过对其实施的动机分析，激励效果和市场的反 馈等方面的进行论证，发现员工持股计划没有激励作用，是福利性质。在内部治 理机制不完善的情况下，在国家法律强制实施员工持股计划的前提下，管理层通 过操控员工持股计划方案的设定，会牺牲股东权益，转移给员工，短期后果，就 是缓和矛盾，降低了管理层的努力程度。长期后果，会导致经营绩效下降和股东 财富减少。通过对案例公司的情况总结，升华到对我国实施员工持股计划的借鉴 意义。 本文的创新点及应用意义在于，（1）基于股东与管理层的委托—代理关系， 在不完善的公司治理机制下，员工持股计划具有福利性质，不会产生激励作用； （2）完善的公司治理机制，能够规范管理层行为，制定科学合理的员工持股计 划方案，实现“股东财富”最大化理论和“相关利益者”财富最大化理论的统一， 共同发挥作用；（3）为我国是否实施强制性员工持股计划提供经验证据。 关键词：员工持股计划；股权激励；财务分析；实施效果 ABSTRACT ii ABSTRACT China Securities Regulatory Commission announced Guidance on Employee Stock Ownership Plans(ESOP) for listed companies to encourage the listed companies to implement ESOPs. In order to combine the interests of the employees with the interests of the shareholders, and encourage the employees and the enterprises to share the benefits and disgrace. According to statistics, from January 2014 to August 2017, as of August 17, 2017, 320 companies implemented ESOP. This paper studies the problem of ESOP. ESOP is welfare and has no incentive effect. The long-term results will lead to the decline of operating performance and the decrease of shareholders' wealth. The research finds that: (1) ESOP is welfare and has no incentive effect. (2) Managers will use employee stock ownership plan to transfer shareholders' rights and interests to employees in order to please employees, thereby reducing management pressure; (3) In the case of imperfect internal governance mechanism, Long-term results will lead to the decline of operating performance and shareholder wealth. This paper takes Schneider Electric's Employee Stock Ownership Plan in France as an example, through the analysis of its implementation motivation, incentive effect and feedback from the market and other aspects, finds that ESOP has no incentive effect and is welfare. In the case of imperfect internal governance mechanism, under the premise of enforcing the Employee Stock Ownership Plan under this e national law, through the operation of Employee Stock Ownership Plan. management will sacrifice shareholders' rights and interests and transfer them to employees in order to appease and reassure them. Short-term results will lead to ease conflicts and reduce the efforts of the management .Through summarizing the situation of the case company, we can draw lessons from the implementation of ESOP in China. The innovations and application significance of this paper lie in: 1) based on the theory of the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management， Employee stock ownership plan is of welfare nature and will not have incentive effect; 2) Perfect corporate governance mechanism can regulate the behavior of management and combine the conflicting "shareholder wealth" maximization theory and "stakeholder wealth maximization theory" to play a role together; 3) providing evidence for the implementation of mandatory employee stock ownership plan. Provide empirical evidence. ABSTRACT iii KEYWORDS：Employee Stock Ownership Plan; Equity incentive; Financial analysis; Implementation effect 目 录 iv 目 录 摘要 .................................................................. i ABSTRACT ............................................................. ii 1 引言 ................................................................ 1 1.1 选题背景与研究问题 ................................................................................................ 1 1.2 研究现状与存在不足 ................................................................................................ 2 1.3 研究思路与本文创新 ................................................................................................ 2 1.3.1 研究思路及研究框架 ......................................................................................... 2 1.3.2 本文创新 ............................................................................................................. 3 1.4 本文的结构安排 ........................................................................................................ 3 2 文献回顾 ............................................................ 5 2.1 员工持股计划 ............................................................................................................ 5 2.2 员工持股计划激励动机的研究 ................................................................................ 6 2.3 员工持股计划激励效果影响因素的研究 ................................................................ 6 2.4 员工持股计划激励实施效果研究 ............................................................................ 6 2.5 已有研究文献综述 .................................................................................................... 7 3 理论分析 ............................................................ 8 3.1 双因素经济论 ........................................................................................................... 8 3.2 利润分享理论 ........................................................................................................... 9 3.3 委托代理理论 ......................................................................................................... 10 4 施耐德电气员工持股计划的案例介绍 ................................... 14 4.1 施耐德电气公司概况 .............................................................................................. 14 4.2 员工持股计划方案介绍 .......................................................................................... 16 4.2.1 员工持股计划的激励对象和范围 ................................................................... 17 4.2.2 员工持股计划的模式 ....................................................................................... 17 4.2.3 员工持股计划的资金来源和股票来源 ........................................................... 17 4.2.4 员工持股计划的行权价格及行权条件 ........................................................... 18 4.2.5 员工持股计划的锁定期限及管理模式 ........................................................... 18 4.2.6施耐德电气员工持股计划权益分配及股份处置办法 .................................... 18 4.3 案例研究方法 .......................................................................................................... 19 5 施耐德电气员工持股计划福利性的原因及对策 ........................... 21 5.1 员工持股计划的背景 .............................................................................................. 21 5.1.1电气设备行业介绍及竞争分析 ........................................................................ 21 目 录 v 5.1.2电气行业的前景与风险 .................................................................................... 21 5.1.3实施员工持股计划的法律环境 ........................................................................ 23 5.2 员工持股计划方案是否具有福利性质 .................................................................. 24 5.2.1 认购员工持股计划的价格过低 ....................................................................... 24 5.2.2 行权条件过低无业绩考核条件 .