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MBA硕士毕业论文_务总监权力优势与公司投资效率研究PDF

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内容简介
全球经济资源紧缺,各个国家越来越注重提高经济资源利用的有效性。随着 我国高质量发展理念的提出,优化社会资源配置成为全社会关注的焦点,从而推 动了企业不断地提高内、外部资源利用效率。企业投资活动俨然是资源配置优化 过程中重要的一环,提高投资活动的有效性,不仅能够促进企业价值增值,也有 利于改善整个社会的经济资源配置效率。信息不对称问题、代理矛盾层出不穷, 致使过度投资导致经济资源流向产能过剩的企业,而投资不足导致企业与良好的 投资机会失之交臂。优化企业资源配置、推动企业高质量发展、提高企业投资效 率是企业健康发展的必然选择。 财务总监转变自身角色,参与企业发展战略与信息决策,利用专业、权力独 特性在一定程度上改善企业投资效率的有效性。本文从高层梯队理论出发,综合 考虑财务总监的所有者权力、组织权力、声誉权力和专家权力,利用主成分分析 法计算出财务总监综合权力优势,研究了财务总监权力优势对企业非效率投资的 影响,既推动了财务总监治理机制的完善,也优化了企业的投资效率。外部环境 带来的机遇与挑战不容忽视,外部环境的不同对财务总监权力优势和企业投资效 率的关系产生一定的影响,本文进一步研究了在市场化进程和产品市场竞争不同 的情况下,财务总监权力优势对企业投资效率的影响。 本文以委托代理和信息不对称理论作为理论基础,理论分析了财务总监权力 优势对企业非效率投资的影响路径,以及外部环境和产权性质对二者关系的影响。 本文选取了2013-2017年全部A股上市公司作为本文的初选研究样本。首先,在 对财务总监权力优势影响企业非投资效率的理论分析基础之上,对二者的关系进 行了实证研究,并按照产权性质分组对财务总监权力优势与企业非效率投资的关 系做了进一步的研究;其次,研究了市场化进程对财务总监权力优势、企业非效 率投资二者关系的影响,进一步研究产权性质差异对市场化进程与财务总监权力 优势关系的影响;最后,分析产品市场竞争对财务总监权力优势与企业非效率投 资二者关系的影响,也探究了产权性质对产品市场竞争与财务总监权力优势关系 的影响。 本文的主要研究结果如下:(1)财务总监权力优势对企业非效率投资存在 显著抑制作用;(2)财务总监权力优势对企业非效率投资的抑制作用在非国有 企业数据组中更显著;(3)市场化水平较低的地区,财务总监权力优势对企业 II 非效率投资的抑制作用较为明显。(4)市场化进程对上述两者关系的影响在国 有企业数据组中最为显著;(5)产品市场竞争提高了财务总监权力优势对企业 非效率投资的抑制作用;(6)产品市场竞争对上述两者关系的影响在国有企业 数据组中更为显著。本文的研究结果表明企业要不断完善财务总监治理机制。适 当提升财务总监权力优势,不仅有利于完善公司治理机制,更有利于改善企业的 非效率投资问题,推动企业高质量发展。外部环境对财务总监权力优势与企业非 效率投资有较大的影响,应着重审视市场化进程、产品市场竞争等外部环境的影 响,从而优化企业内部权力机构配置,改善企业的投资效率。 关键词:财务总监权力优势;非效率投资;产权性质;市场化进程;产品市 场竞争 III Abstract Theglobaleconomyisshortofresources,andcountriesarepayingmoreandmore attentiontoimprovingtheeffectivenessofeconomicresourcesutilization.Withthe conceptofhigh-qualitydevelopmentputforwardinChina,optimizingtheallocationof socialresourceshasbecomethefocusofattentionofthewholesociety,thuspromoting enterprisestocontinuouslyimprovetheefficiencyofinternalandexternalresources utilization.Enterpriseinvestmentactivitiesareanimportantpartoftheprocessof resourceallocationoptimization.Improvingtheeffectivenessofinvestmentactivities cannotonlypromotethevalueaddedofenterprises,butalsoimprovetheefficiencyof economicresourceallocationofthewholesociety.Asymmetricinformationandagency conflictsemergeinanendlessstream,resultinginexcessiveinvestment,whichleadsto theoverflowingofeconomicresourcestoenterprises.Insufficientinvestmentleadsto thelossofgoodinvestmentopportunities.Optimizingtheallocationofenterprise resources,promotinghigh-qualitydevelopmentofenterprisesandimprovingthe efficiencyofenterpriseinvestmentareinevitablechoicesforthehealthydevelopmentof enterprises. Tosomeextent,thefinancialdirectorcanimprovetheefficiencyofenterprise investmentbychanginghisrole,participatinginenterprisedevelopmentstrategyand informationdecision-making,andutilizingtheuniquenessofspecialtyandpower. Startingfromthetheoryofhigh-levelechelon,thispapercomprehensivelyconsidersthe ownershippower,organizationalpower,reputationpowerandexpertpowerofCFO, calculatesthecomprehensivepoweradvantageofCFObyusingprincipalcomponent analysismethod,studiestheinfluenceofpoweradvantageofCFOoninefficient investmentofenterprises,andpromotesthegovernancemechanismofCFO.The improvementalsooptimizestheinvestmentefficiencyofenterprises.Opportunitiesand challengesbroughtbytheexternalenvironmentcannotbeignored.Thedifferent externalenvironmenthasacertainimpactontherelationshipbetweenthepower advantageofCFOandtheefficiencyofenterpriseinvestment.Thispaperfurtherstudies theinfluenceofthepoweradvantageofCFOontheefficiencyofenterpriseinvestment underthedifferentmarketprocessandproductmarketcompetition. IV Basedontheprincipal-agenttheoryandinformationasymmetrytheory,thispaper theoreticallyanalysestheinfluencepathofthepoweradvantageofCFOonthe inefficientinvestmentofenterprises,aswellastheinfluenceofexternalenvironment andpropertyrightnatureontherelationshipbetweenthem.ThispaperchoosesallA- sharelistedcompaniesfrom2013to2017astheprimaryresearchsample.Firstly,based onthetheoreticalanalysisoftheinfluenceofthepowersuperiorityofCFOonthenon- investmentefficiencyofenterprises,thispapermakesanempiricalstudyonthe relationshipbetweenthepowersuperiorityofCFOandtheinefficientinvestmentof enterprises,andfurtherstudiestherelationshipbetweenthepowersuperiorityofCFO andtheinefficientinvestmentofenterprisesaccordingtothenatureofpropertyrights. Theinfluenceofsupervisorypowersuperiorityandinefficientinvestmentonthe relationshipbetweensupervisorypowersuperiorityandcorporatepowersuperiorityis furtherstudied.Finally,thepaperanalysestheinfluenceofproductmarketcompetition ontherelationshipbetweenpoweradvantageofCFOandinefficientinvestmentof enterprises,andexplorestheinfluenceofpropertyrightnatureontherelationship betweenpoweradvantageofCFOandproductmarketcompetition. Themainresearchresultsofthispaperareasfollows:(1)thepoweradvantageof CFOhasasignificantinhibitionontheinefficientinvestmentofenterprises;(2)the poweradvantageofCFOhasamoresignificantinhibitionontheinefficientinvestment ofenterprisesinthedatagroupofnon-state-ownedenterprises;(3)thepoweradvantage ofCFOhasasignificantinhibitionontheinefficientinvestmentofenterprisesinthe areaswithalowerlevelofmarketization.Therestrainingeffectofinefficient investmentisobvious.(4)Themarket-orientedprocesshasthemostsignificantimpact ontheabove-mentionedrelationshipinthedatagroupofstate-ownedenterprises;(5) productmarketcompetitionhasenhancedtherestraintofthepoweradvantageofCFO ontheinefficientinvestmentofenterprises;(6)theimpactofproductmarket competitionontheabove-mentionedrelationshipismoresignificantinthedatagroupof state-ownedenterprises.Theresultsofthisstudyshowthatifenterpriseswantto constantlyimprovethegovernancemechanismofCFOandproperlyenhancethepower advantagesofCFO,itwillnotonlyimprovethecorporategovernancemechanism,but alsoimprovetheinefficientinvestmentproblemsofenterprisesandpromotethehigh- V qualitydevelopmentofenterprises.Externalenvironmenthasgreatinfluenceonthe powersuperiorityofCFOandtheinefficientinvestmentofenterprises.Weshouldfocus onexaminingtheinfluenceofexternalenvironmentsuchasmarket-orientedprocess andproductmarketcompetition,soastooptimizetheallocationofinternalauthority andimprovetheinvestmentefficiencyofenterprises. Keywords:FinancialController'sPowerAdvantage;Non-efficientInvestment; PropertyRightNature;Market-OrientedProcess;ProductMarketCompetition VII 目录 摘要..................................................................................................................................I 1绪论................................................................................................................................1 1.1研究背景.................................................................................................................1 1.2研究意义.................................................................................................................3 1.3研究内容及研究方法.............................................................................................3 1.3.1研究内容..........................................................................................................4 1.3.2研究方法..........................................................................................................6 1.4创新之处.................................................................................................................7 2相关文献综述与理论基础............................................................................................9 2.1文献综述.................................................................................................................9 2.1.1企业投资效率..................................................................................................9 2.1.2财务总监权力优势的经济后果....................................................................12 2.1.3国内外文献述评............................................................................................15 2.2理论分析...............................................................................................................16 2.2.1高层梯队理论................................................................................................16 2.2.2信息不对称理论............................................................................................17 2.2.3委托代理理论................................................................................................18 2.2.4管理层权力理论............................................................................................19 3财务总监权力优势影响企业投资效率的机理分析..................................................21 3.1财务总监权力优势影响企业投资效率的理论分析与假设提出.......................21 3.2外部环境影响财务总监权力优势与企业非效率投资关系的路径分析...........23 4财务总监权力优势影响企业投资效率的研究设计及检验结果..............................29 4.1财务总监权力优势影响企业投资效率的研究设计...........................................29 4.1.1样本选取和数据来源....................................................................................29 4.1.2主要变量........................................................................................................29 4.1.3模型建立........................................................................................................35 4.2检验结果...............................................................................................................35 4.2.1投资效率模型估计结果................................................................................35 4.2.2样本的描述性统计........................................................................................36 VIII 4.2.3主要变量的相关性检验................................................................................37 4.2.4财务总监权力优势影响企业投资效率的检验结果....................................38 4.2.5外部环境影响财务总监权力优势与企业非效率投资关系的检验结果....42 4.3稳健性检验...........................................................................................................46 5研究结论及政策性建议..............................................................................................53 5.1研究结论...............................................................................................................53 5.2政策性建议...........................................................................................................55 5.3研究局限...............................................................................................................57 5.4研究展望...............................................................................................................57。。。。。。以下内容略