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MBA毕业论文_于产品市场竞争视角下制造业企业高管激励与金融资产配置研究PDF

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制造业是一个国家创造新财富能力水平的直接体现,我国制造业作为国家先 导性产业一直处于良好的发展态势。影响制造业发展的因素包括企业创新投入、 企业投资结构、企业金融资产配置状况等。随着人口红利的消失以及人工费用的 增长,传统的制造业发展严重受到限制,以人工智能为代表的新的生产方式正在 给制造业带来革命性产业变革。公司高管处于企业权力体系的核心地位,其作出 的决策对企业发展起到举足轻重的作用,尤其是金融资产配置决策。但是高管自 利行为的存在使得高管利用职务之便谋取岗位最大利益成为可能,进而引发严重 的委托代理问题,产品市场竞争通过提高市场上信息透明度能够对高管自肥动机 起到一定的监督,由此缓解委托代理问题。由于高管对不同的高管激励措施存在 不同的反应,那么在产品市场竞争的作用下,不同高管激励措施使得企业高管在 企业金融资产配置问题上将会产生不同决策行为。因此企业需要建立完善的高管 激励体系和拥有配套的高管激励措施来约束高管行为,使高管能够自觉地立足于 产品市场竞争视角作出一系列促进企业长期发展的决策。在这样的背景下,本文 研究高管激励、产品市场竞争和企业金融资产配置之间存在的内在机理具有良好 的现实意义。 本文利用2010-2018年在深沪上市制造业公司作为文章的样本数据来探讨高 管激励、产品市场竞争和企业金融资产配置这三者之间的关系。首先利用相关的 理论基础确定研究范式并且提出有关研究理论假设,根据要检验的研究假设构建 有关实证回归模型。随后利用计量软件对数据进行相应处理以及进行实证回归, 最后根据回归结果得出实证结论并与先前所提假设进行比对。研究结论显示:高 管薪酬激励能够促进企业金融资产配置而高管股权激励则抑制企业金融资产配 置,尤其是非国有企业;产品市场竞争也能够抑制企业金融资产配置,且产品市 场竞争在高管激励和企业金融资产配置这两对关系中均起到了调节作用,产品市 场竞争削弱了高管薪酬激励对企业金融资产配置促进作用而增强了高管股权激 励对企业金融资产配置抑制作用,且非国有企业中的调节效应更强。最后综合上 述结论提出相对应的政策建议。 关键词:高管激励;产品市场竞争;金融资产配置;制造业。 II Abstract Manufacturing is a direct manifestation of a country's ability to create new wealth, the manufacturing industry of China has always been in a good development trend and is a pillar industry of the country. Factors which affect the development of the manufacturing industry include corporate innovation investment, corporate investment structure, corporate financial asset allocation and so on. The traditional manufacturing’s development has restricted severely due to the demographic dividend’s disappearance and the labor costs’ increace, and the new production methods represented by artificial intelligence are bringing revolutionary industrial changes to the manufacturing industry. Company executives are at the core of the corporate power system, and the decisions they make play an important role in the development of the company, especially in the allocation of financial assets. However, the existence of self-serving behavior of executives makes it possible for executives to use their positions to obtain the maximum benefits of their positions, and then causes serious agency problems. Because executives have different reflections on different executive incentives, then under the influence of product market competition, different executive incentives will cause corporate executives to have different decision-making behaviors on the issue of corporate financial asset allocation. Therefore, enterprises need to establish a complete executive incentive system and have supporting executive incentive measures to restrict executive behavior, so that company executives can consciously make a series of decisions based on the perspective of product market competition in order to stimulate its long-term progress. In this context, this paper has good practical significance to study the internal mechanisms that exist between executive incentives, product market competition, and corporate financial asset allocation. The listed sample companies are used in this paper including both Shenzhen and Shanghai bourse during the period 2010-2018 to talk over the relationship among executive incentives, product market competition and corporate financial asset allocation. Firstly, we use the relevant theoretical basis to determine the research paradigm, and the relevant research hypotheses are proposed. The relevant empirical regression models are constructed according to the research hypotheses to be tested. Then the data is processed and the empirical regression is carried out by using the III measurement software stata14.0. Finally, the empirical conclusions are obtained according to the regression results and compared with the previously mentioned hypotheses. The research results show that executive compensation incentives can promote corporate financial asset allocation and executive equity incentives inhibit corporate financial asset allocation, and in non-state-owned enterprises, this relationship is more significant; product market competition can also inhibit corporate financial asset allocation, and product market competition plays a regulatory role in the relationship between executive incentives and corporate financial asset allocation. Product market competition weakens the promotion of executive compensation incentives to corporate financial asset allocation and enhances executive equity incentives to corporate financial asset allocation, and the regulatory effect in non-state-owned enterprises is stronger. Finally, the above conclusions are combined to propose corresponding policy recommendations. Key Words: Executive incentives; Product market competition; Financial asset allocation; Manufacturing. IV 目 录 摘要 ........................................................................................................................... I Abstract ..................................................................................................................... II 第1章 绪论............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 选题背景与意义 ............................................................................................ 1 1.2 国内外研究现状 ............................................................................................ 3 1.2.1 企业金融资产配置的研究动态 ............................................................... 3 1.2.2 高管激励与企业金融资产配置的研究动态 ............................................ 4 1.2.3 产品市场竞争与企业金融资产配置的研究动态 .................................... 5 1.3 研究内容与基本框架..................................................................................... 7 1.4 研究方法与创新之处..................................................................................... 8 1.4.1 研究方法 .................................................................................................. 8 1.4.2 创新之处 .................................................................................................. 9 第2章 相关理论基础 ........................................................................................... 10 2.1 产品市场竞争治理效应理论 ....................................................................... 10 2.2 利益相关者理论 .......................................................................................... 10 2.3 委托代理理论 ............................................................................................... 11 2.4 信息不对称理论 .......................................................................................... 12 第3章 研究假设与模型设计 ................................................................................ 14 3.1 研究假设 ...................................................................................................... 14 3.1.1 高管激励和企业金融资产配置的关系假设 .......................................... 14 3.1.2 不同产权性质高管激励和企业金融资产配置的关系假设 ................... 15 3.1.3 产品市场竞争和企业金融资产配置的关系假设 .................................. 16 3.1.4 高管激励、产品市场竞争与企业金融资产配置的关系假设 ............... 16 3.2 产品市场竞争视角下高管激励与金融资产配置的研究范式 ....................