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MBA硕士毕业论文_江移动装维众包平台定价策略研究PDF

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随着携号转网政策的到来,运营商之间的市场竞争不断加剧,中国移动用户流失压力 巨大。浙江移动作为中国移动龙头子公司,希望通过手机与宽带 的捆绑业务增加客户黏性。 因此,浙江移动需要依托宽带装维众包平台,通过众包模式进一步强化宽带装维服务,提 升宽带用户满意度,在竞争中获得一定的优势,占据更大的 宽带市场份额。宽带装维众包 平台作为新兴平台,定价问题是让装维众包平台有更强的成长与盈利能力的关键要素。 本文首先对众包平台理论、双边市场理论、价格形成理论、 博弈论、霍特林模型进行 阐述。之后本文在装维众包平台的运行模式的基础上,对在运行过程中宽带用户与装维众 包平台的博弈过程以及装维公司与装维众包平台的博弈过程进 行分析,分析了不同博弈下 的纳什均衡解。得出了参与者是通过比较获得的效用来选择不同的众包平台的结论,即平 台如果能够提供更多的效用,就能够获取更多的用户。在此 基础上,本文测算了在寡头竞 争市场下不同平台的收益。以经典的霍特林模型为基础,本文假设线性城市存在两个平台 YD及DX,建立了考虑初始效用,组间网络外部性,组内网 络外部性,对双边用户收取的 接入费,使用费以及初始成本在内的模型,并依据用户的单归属或多归属,求解了在均衡 条件下,不同装维众包平台的效用,定价及双边用户数量 。 本文以浙江移动装维众包平台为案例,确认了在装维公司多归属,在收费模式中采用使 用费的前提下,为了获得最大效用,平台对双边用户的定价与装维公司自身的组内网络 外部 性、装维公司与宽带用户的组间网络外部性以及平台之间的差异化因子有关。因此装维众包 平台可以通过打造平台差异化服务,强化装维供公司相互竞争机制,划分区域减 少防止大型 装维公司垄断,扩大平台注册宽带用户数等措施来增加平台的议价能力,获取最大效用。 本文的研究有别于以往的纯理论模型研究,着眼于特定商业模式下众包平台 的定价模 型探讨,并将现有理论应用于具体的商业案例之中。同时给浙江移动装维众包平台提出部 分策略建议,以期推动浙江移动装维众包平台发展,并以此为案例为其余众包 平台的发展 提供参考。 关键词:众包平台;定价机制;双边市场;三方博弈;霍特林模型 浙江理工大学硕士专业学位论文 II Abstract Withthecomingofmobilenumberportabilitywhichallowsmobileuserstoshiftfromone operatortoanotherwithoutchangingnumbers,thecompetitionbetweenoperatorsisincreasingly intensified,ChinaMobileisunderhugepressuretolosesubscribers.ZhejiangMobile,aleading subsidiaryofChinaMobile,hopestoincreasecustomerloyaltybybundlingmobilephoneswith broadband.Therefore,Relyingonthecrowdsourcingplatform,ZhejiangMobileneedstofurther strengthenthebroadbandinstallationandmaintenanceservicesthroughthecrowd- sourcing mode,improvethebroadbandusers’satisfaction,gaincertainadvantagesinthecompetition,and occupyalargerbroadbandmarketshare.Asanewplatform,pricingisthekeyfactortomakethe crowdsourcingplatformhavestrongergrowthandprofitability. Firstly,thispaperexpoundscrowdsourcingplatformtheory,bilateralmarkettheory,price formationtheory,gametheoryandHotellingmodel.Then,basedontheoperationmodeofthe crowdsourcingplatform,thispaperanalyzesthegameprocessbetweenbroadbandusersand thecrowdsourcingplatform,aswellasthegameprocessbetweenthecompanyandthe crowdsourcingplatform,andanalyzestheNashequilibriumsolutionunderdifferentgames. Theconclusionisthattheparticipantschoosedifferentcrowdsourcingplatformsbycomparing theobtainedeffects,witchmeans,iftheplatformcanprovidemoreeffects,itcanobtainmore users.Onthisbasis,thispapercalculatestheincomeofdifferentplatformsintheoligopoly market.BasedontheclassicHotellingmodel,thispaperassumingthattherearetwoplatforms YDandDXinlinearcity,amodelconsideringtheinitialutility,cross-groupnetwork externality,networkexternality,accessfee,usagefeeandinitialcostfortwo-sidedusersis established.Accordingtothesingleormultipleattributionofusers,theutilityofdifferent installationandmaintenanceplatformsunderequilibriumconditionsisdeterminedPriceand numberofbilateralusers. ThispapertakesZhejiangMobile'scrowdsourcingplatformasanexampletoconfirmthat thepricingoftheplatformforbilateralusersisrelatedtothenetworkexternalitiesofcompanies, thecross- groupnetworkexternalitiesofcompaniesandbroadbandusers,andthedifferentiation factorsbetweentheplatformsinordertoobtainthemaximumutilityunderthepremiseof 浙江 理工大学硕士专业学位论文 III multipleattributionofcompaniesandtheusagefeesinthechargingmode.Therefore,the followingmeasurescanbeadoptedfortheplatformtocreateplatformdifferentiatedservices. Theaccessthresholdofthecompanyisraised.Wecanstrengthenthecompetitionmechanism betweenthecompanies,aswellasdividingtheregions,preventingthemonopolyoflarge- scale companies.Wecanalsoexpandthenumberofregisteredbroadbandusers.Bytheseways,itis possibletoincreasethebargainingpoweroftheplatformandobtainthemaximumeffect. Theresearchinthispaperisdifferentfromthepreviouspuretheoreticalresearch,focusing onthediscussionofthepricingmodelofcrowdsourcingplatformunderaspecificbusiness model,andapplyingtheexistingtheoriestospecificbusinesscases.Atthesametime,some strategiesandsuggestionsareproposedforZhejiangMobileinstallationandmaintenance crowdsourcingplatform,hopingtopromotethedevelopmentofZhejiangMobileinstallationand maintenancecrowdsourcingplatform,andprovidereferenceforthedevelopmentofother crowdsourcingplatformsbasedonthiscase. Keywords:CrowdsourcingPlatform;PricingMechanism;BilateralMarket;Three-WayGame; HotellingModel 浙江理工大学硕士专业学位论文 IV 目录 摘 要...............................................................................................................................................I Abstract.........................................................................................................................................II 目 录............................................................................................................................................IV 1绪 论..............................................................................................................................................1 1.1研究背景 .....................................................................................................................................................1 1.1.1 中国移动一家独大的市场竞争格局.............................................................................................1 1.1.2携号转网政策给中国移动带来 巨大挑战.....................................................................................3 1.1.3浙江移动宽带市场现 状.................................................................................................................3 1.1.4浙江移动应对携号转网策 略.........................................................................................................4 1.1.5浙江移动推行装维众包平台应对痛 点.........................................................................................6 1.2研究目的及意 义.......................................................................................................................................10 1.3研究内 容...................................................................................................................................................10 1.4研 究方法和研究框架及技术路线..........................................................................................................11 1.4.1研究方 法.......................................................................................................................................11 1.4.2研究框 架.......................................................................................................................................11 1.4.3技术路 线.......................................................................................................................................13 1.5本文创新 点...............................................................................................................................................14 2理论基础 及文献综述...............................................................................................................15 2.1基本概念综 述.........................................................................................................................