随着社会经济的发展，资源短缺、环境污染和气候变暖等问题日益突出。而再 制造可以对废旧产品进行回收再利用，提高资源的利用率，减少污染物的排放。再 制造因其带来的经济效益和环境效益，受到业界和学界的广泛关注。 本文首先介绍了一个由生产实践驱动的两层再制造系统。在这个再制造系统 中，制造商生产新产品和再制造产品，核心部件再制造商回收废旧产品以生产再制 造核心零部件，并供应给制造商生产再制造产品。本文考虑了制造商和核心部件再 制造商之间的交互式生产约束，构建了一个四步 Stackelberg 博弈模型来研究两个企 业间的交互决策。研究结果表明，由于交互式生产约束的存在，当再制造核心零部 件的交易价格比较低时，核心部件再制造商不能完全满足制造商对于再制造核心零 部件的需求，反之，制造商则无法全部接收核心部件再制造商所能提供的再制造核 心零部件。交互式生产约束显著影响了企业的决策和再制造系统的绩效。对此，本 文提出了交叉广告策略以降低交互式生产约束的负面影响，即制造商做促进废旧产 品回收的环保广告和核心部件再制造商做促进再制造产品销售的绿色营销广告，研 究结果表明，不论是制造商促进废旧产品回收的绿色环保广告还是核心部件再制造 商促进再制造产品销售的绿色营销广告，都能够提高企业双方的利润以及再制造系 统的环境绩效。 此外，本文还将含有交互式生产约束的再制造系统拓展到单个企业情形和竞争 情形，并进一步考虑消费者价格参照行为对需求的影响，运用效用理论刻画需求函 数。在此基础上，构建数学模型，研究两种情形下企业的最优生产定价和回收决策。 研究发现，消费者的价格参照强度等因素对企业生产定价和回收决策的影响不仅与 新产品和再制造产品的生产成本有关，还与消费者对再制造产品的容忍度、投入成 本系数有关。此外，通过对两种情形下产品定价、制造商利润和再制造系统环境绩 效的比较，本文发现，两种情形下产品定价的高低与再制造产品的生产成本有关， 环境绩效的高低与再制造产品的生产成本和投入成本系数有关，授权费用的高低决 I定着制造商的策略选择，而授权费用的阈值又受到消费者价格参照强度的影响。 关键词：交互式生产约束，交叉广告，价格参照，消费者环保意识，博弈论 IIPRODUCT PRICING AND RECYCLING IN A REMANUFACTURING SYSTEM Abstract With the development of the society and economy, problems such as shortage of re- sources, environmental pollution and climate warming have become increasingly promi- nent. Remanufacturing can improve resource utilization and reduce pollutant emissions by recycling and reusing used products. Remanufacturing has attracted the extensive at- tention from practitioners and academic communities due to its considerable potential economic and ecological benefits. A two-echelon remanufacturing system motivated by the production practice is in- troduced in this thesis. In the remanufacturing system, the manufacturer produces new and remanufactured products, whereas the core remanufacturer recycles used products and makes remanufactured cores which are supplied to the manufacturer to make reman- ufactured products. A four-step Stackelberg game model is developed to investigate the two firms’ interactive decisions with interactive production constraints. Analytical results show that, the core remanufacturer cannot fully satisfy the manufacturer’s demand with adequate remanufactured cores when the transaction price is at a low level, conversely, the manufacturer cannot accept all remanufactured cores that the core remanufacturer is sup- plying due to the interactive production constraints. Interactive production constraints sig- nificantly influence the firms’ decisions and the performances of remanufacturing system. We propose a cross-advertisement strategy to weaken the negative impacts of interactive production constraints, i.e., the manufacturer’s environmental advertisement on promot- ing used-product recoveries and the core remanufacturer’s green marketing advertisement on promoting remanufactured-product sales. We find that either the manufacturer’s envi- ronmental advertisement on used-product recoveries or the core remanufacturer’s green marketing advertisement on remanufactured-product sales can benefit the two firms in IIIterms of profits and the remanufacturing system in terms of environmental performances. In addition, we also extend the remanufacturing system with interactive production constraints to a monopoly situation and a duopoly situation, and further consider the im- pacts of consumers’ price reference behavior on demand, and use utility theory to char- acterize the demand function. On this basis, a mathematical model is formulated to study the firms’ optimal production pricing and recovery decisions under the two situations. The results show that the influences of consumers’ price reference coefficient and other factors on the firms’ production pricing and recycling decisions are not only related to the production cost of new products and remanufactured products, but also related to con- sumers’ tolerance to the remanufactured products and setup cost coefficient. Moreover, by comparing the product pricing, manufacturer’s profits and environmental performances of remanufacturing system between the two situations, we find that the differences of prod- uct pricing between the two situations are related to the production cost of remanufactured products, the differences of environmental performances of remanufacturing system be- tween the two situations are related to the production cost of remanufactured products and setup cost coefficient. The authorization fee determines the manufacturer’s strate- gic choice, and the threshold of the authorization fee is affected by the consumers’ price reference coefficient. Keywords: interactive production constraints, crossed advertisement, price refer- ence, consumers ’ environmental awareness, game theory IV目 录 中文摘要 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III 第一章 前言 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 研究背景 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 本文的主要研究内容 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2.1 研究内容 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2.2 研究思路 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 第二章 相关问题研究综述 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1 再制造系统产品定价 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2 再制造系统产品回收 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3 供应链管理中的广告研究 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4 消费者价格参照行为研究 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5 本章小结 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 第三章 再制造系统中产品定价与回收 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1 问题描述和模型构建 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2 定价和回收决策分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.3 绩效改进策略：交叉广告分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3.1 制造商的环保广告策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3.2 核心部件再制造商的绿色营销广告策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.3.3 交叉广告的环境绩效分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4 本章小结 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 第四章 考虑消费者价格参照行为的产品定价与回收 . . . . . . . . . 33 4.1 价格参照行为影响下的需求分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2 单个企业情形下产品定价与回收决策 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3 竞争情形下产品定价与回收决策 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.4 制造商的策略选择与分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 V4.5 本章小结 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 第五章 总结展望 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.1 研究结论 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.2 研究展望 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51