随着我国城镇化建设的不断推进,PPP（Public-Private Partership),即政府与社 会资本合作模式正逐渐成为公共基础设施中的一种新型的项目操作模式。然而， 由于我国的 PPP 发展还处在起步阶段，制度环境尚未健全，在实际操作中还存 在着许多风险。作为 PPP 资金的主要提供者，这也给商业银行带来了新的挑战。 如何控制这些风险，保证自身利益的最大化，成为银行在参与 PPP 项目中的一 个重要问题。 笔者借鉴发达国家的成功经验，结合我国 PPP 发展的现状，站在银行的角 度指出了 PPP 模式给商业银行带来的机遇和风险，并重点强调了我国 PPP 市场 中在量化指标上的缺失。故笔者想要尝试从量化的角度研究 PPP 项目中的风险 分担问题，主要运用博弈论原理建立了政府、私人部门、银行之间的三方博弈模 型，结合问卷调查和案例分析，对 PPP 项目中参与各方的风险分担进行量化分 析。根据三方对风险的喜好程度和承受能力，得出在纳什均衡条件下，三方的风 险分配比。再将计算结果带入江东大道（河庄大道-青六路）提升改造及地下综 合管廊建设的案例。交相关专家打分，并将评价结果代入方程式计算得出某一风 险项下各方承担的具体数值。笔者建议将这一方案写入合同，作为标准化合同中 的一个参考指标。 在我国目前 PPP 市场前景还不明朗，法律政策环境还不健全的前提下，该 方法为 PPP 各参与方提供了风险分担的依据，对银行而言也是风险防控的有效 措施。 关键词，PPP，商业银行，风险分担，三方博弈 论文类型，应用基础研究浙江工业大学硕士学位论文 银行在 PPP 项目中的风险控制研究——基于三方博弈模型 IV RESEARCH ON RISK SHARING OF BANKS IN PPP PROJECTS ——BASED ON THE THREE PARTY GAME MODEL ABSTRACT With the continuous advancement of urbanization in China, PPP (Public-Private Partership), that is, the cooperation mode between government and social capital, is gradually becoming a new project operation mode in public infrastructure. However, as the development of PPP in China is still in its infancy, the institutional environment is not yet sound, and there are still many risks in practice. As the main provider of PPP funds, it also brings new challenges to commercial banks. How to control these risks and maximize their own interests has become an important issue for banks to participate in PPP projects. Based on the successful experience of developed countries and the current situation of PPP development in China, the author points out the opportunities and risks brought by PPP model to commercial banks from the perspective of banks, and emphasizes the lack of quantitative indicators in China's PPP market. Therefore, I want to try to study the risk sharing in PPP project from the quantitative point of view. This paper mainly uses the game theory to establish a tripartite game model among government, private sector and bank. Combined with questionnaire survey and case analysis, it makes a quantitative analysis of the risk sharing among the participants in PPP project. According to the degree of risk preference and acceptance ability of the three parties, the risk allocation ratio of the three parties under Nash equilibrium conditions is obtained. Then the calculation results are brought into the case of Jiangdong Avenue (Hezhuang Avenue - Qingliu Road) upgrading and reconstruction and underground comprehensive pipeline Gallery construction. Relevant experts will be scored, and the evaluation results will be substituted into the equation to calculate the specific value of each party under a certain risk. The author suggests that this scheme should be included in the contract as an index in standardized contract. On the premise that the market prospect of PPP in China is not clear and the legal and policy environment is not perfect, this method provides the basis for risk sharing for all participants in PPP, and is also an effective measure for risk prevention and control for banks. KEY WORDS:PPP;Commercial Bank,;Risk Allocation;Three Party Game TYPE OF DISSERTATION / THESIS:Application Fundamentals浙江工业大学硕士学位论文 银行在 PPP 项目中的风险控制研究——基于三方博弈模型 V 目 录 1 绪论........................................................................................................1 1.1 研究背景.......................................................................................................1 1.2 研究目的.......................................................................................................1 1.3 拟解决的核心问题.......................................................................................2 1.4 研究思路.......................................................................................................3 1.5 论文结构.......................................................................................................3 1.6 主要方法.......................................................................................................3 1.7 论文的不足与改进.......................................................................................4 2 理论基础与文献综述...........................................................................5 2.1 理论基础...................................................................................................... 5 2.1.1 博弈论.......................................................................................................... 5 2.1.2 纳什均衡...................................................................................................... 7 2.2 文献综述......................................................................................................8 2.2.1 国外对 PPP 的研究现状.............................................................................8 2.2.2 国内对 PPP 的研究现状.............................................................................9 3 PPP 项目在国内外发展现状与趋势..................................................13 3.1 PPP 的内涵 .........................................................................................13 3.2 PPP 项目在国内外发展现状与趋势 ......................................................13 4 商业银行在 PPP 项目中的机会与风险.............................................19 4.1 商业银行在 PPP 项目中的机会......................................................................19 4.2 商业银行在 PPP 项目中的风险......................................................................19 4.3 商业银行明确 PPP 项目风险分担机制的重要性 ....................................23 5 模型的建立....................................................................................... 25 5.1 模型的理论依据..............................................................................................25 5.1.1 讨价还价博弈.......................................................................................... 25 5.1.2 无限回合讨价还价..................................................................................25 5.1.3 三方相互威慑的讨价还价......................................................................25 5.2 模型的建立......................................................................................................26 5.2.1 博弈过程的描述......................................................................................26 5.2.2 模型的基本假设......................................................................................27 5.2.3 模型博弈树..............................................................................................27 5.2.4 模型的建立..............................................................................................29 5.2.5 模型的求解..............................................................................................29浙江工业大学硕士学位论文 银行在 PPP 项目中的风险控制研究——基于三方博弈模型 VI 6 模型的应用......................................................................................... 33 6.1 项目概况..........................................................................................................33 6.2 项目内容与合作机制......................................................................................33 6.3 项目回报和风险分配......................................................................................34 结论............................................................................................................38