内蒙古作为我国主要的煤炭生产基地，依托丰富的资源和优越的地理位置优势， 被公认为是国家重要的能源基地，全国电力输出大省区。内蒙古自治区在火力发电行 业的发展方面目前也存在着不小的问题。其中，影响全区能源供需综合平衡状况的关 键所在，是关于煤电供应链各环节的协调问题。当前，自治区政府积极推进煤电一体 化、建设坑口电站以及鼓励签订长期电煤协议等利于内蒙古煤电企业供应链协调的政 策，但煤电企业间的矛盾还不能从根本上被协调。内蒙古煤电之争实质是煤电企业的 收益分配以及电煤合同违约问题。如何在不断深入电煤市场化改革这一大背景下，使 煤电供应链上各成员之间的利益得到合理分配以及使煤电供应链成员的行为得到约 束继而解决煤电矛盾，是保障煤炭企业、电力企业、煤电供应链整体得以健康发展的 关键所在。 本文首先分析了内蒙古自治区煤电企业供应链的协调现状，发现一些问题。构建 收益分配博弈模型，信用惩罚机制模型，电网补贴模型；对煤电企业收益分配、合同 兑现行为约束、电网补贴决策进行分析。其次，根据内蒙古煤电企业相关数据给参数 赋值，进行模拟仿真，得出相关分析结果。 研究结果表明，（1）从内蒙古煤电企业收益分配仿真结果来看，煤电企业联营， 煤炭企业收益和煤电供应链的整体收益要高于不联营情况下的收益。电力企业的收益 却低于不联营情况下的收益，内蒙古煤电企业供应链的整体收益高于不联营情况下的 收益而趋势为随着利他系数的增大，总收益先增加后减少。因此，为了达到煤电供应 链协调的目的。需要二次分配内蒙古煤电企业供应链的收益，依据煤炭企业、电力企 业以及供应链整体在联营情况下收益都要大于不联营情况下收益的原则，确定二次收 益分配系数取值范围。从而达到煤电供应链各主体共赢的目的。（2）从内蒙古煤电企 业长期契约信用机制仿真结果来看，采用缺货成本惩罚机制的情况下，缺货成本系数 的增大会促进电煤合同履行率的提高，而利他系数的增大会使电煤合同履行率先增大 后减小。采用收益惩罚机制的情况下，收益惩罚系数的增大会促进电煤合同履行率的 提高，而利他系数的增大会使电煤合同履行率减小。（3）从电网公司补贴仿真结果来 看，随着煤炭价格的提高，电网公司的补贴价格、补贴后上网电价和补贴系数都有所 提高。内蒙古煤电企业不同的一体化程度，电网对应补贴也不同，一体化程度越高， 电网补贴相对越低。因此，电网公司在对电力企业进行补贴时，应先确定相应一体化 程度，制定较为合理的补贴决策。 最后在实证分析及仿真结果分析基础上，分别从内蒙古自治区政府和内蒙古煤电 企业角度提出供应链协调建议。内蒙古工业大学硕士学位论文 II 关键词，内蒙古；煤电供应链；收益分配；Stackelberg 模型内蒙古工业大学硕士学位论文 III Abstract As a major coal production base in China, Inner Mongolia is recognized as an important energy base of the country, relying on its abundant resources and superior geographical advantages. However, at present, there are some certain problems in the development of the thermal power generation industry in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Among them, the coordinated development of various links in the coal-fired power supply chain is always being the key factor to affecting the basic pattern of energy supply as well as the demand and the comprehensive balanced energy situation in the region.Currently, even though the autonomous regional government actively promotes the integration of coal and electricity, the construction of the pit power station, and encourages the signing of long-term coal agreements, which are conducive to the coordination of supply chain coordination of coal-fired power enterprises in Inner Mongolia, it is still not possible to fundamentally coordinate the contradiction between coal-fired power companies. The actual dispute between coal and electricity in Inner Mongolia is the distribution of income from coal-fired power companies and the default of thermal coal contracts. How to rationally distribute the interests among the members of the coal supply chain and constrain the behavior of the supply chain members in the context of the deepening of the market reform of the coal market is the key point of coal power supply chain coordination, which is also the key to protect coal production enterprises and power generation enterprises and the overall development of the coal power supply chain. First of all, this paper analyzes the current situation of supply chain coordination in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and finds its existing problems. By constructing a game model, a credit penalty mechanism model, a grid subsidy model; analyze the coal-electricity enterprise income distribution, contract-to-current constraints, and grid subsidy decisions. Secondly, according to the relevant data of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises, the parameters are assigned and simulated by this paper, and the relevant analysis results are obtained. The results show that: (1) From the simulation results of the income distribution of coal-fired enterprises in Inner Mongolia, the coal-fired enterprises jointly, the coal enterprise income and the coal-fired supply chain as a whole is higher than the non-joined income. The income of power companies is lower than that of non-joint ventures. The内蒙古工业大学硕士学位论文 IV overall income of the supply chain of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises is higher than that of non-joint ventures. The trend is that as the altruistic factor increases, the total income increases first and then decreases. Therefore, in order to achieve the purpose of coal power supply chain coordination, the income of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises needs to be distributed twice. According to the joint venture, the overall income of coal enterprises, power companies and supply chains should be greater than the income under the non-joint ventures, and the range of the second-income distribution coefficient should be determined. Thereby achieving the goal of a win-win situation for all subjects in the coal power supply chain. (2) From the simulation results of the long-term contractual credit mechanism of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises, in the case of the out-of-stock cost penalty mechanism, the increase of the out-of-stock cost coefficient will promote the improvement of the performance rate of the thermal coal contract, and the increase of the altruistic coefficient will The performance of the thermal coal contract will increase first and then decrease. In the case of the income penalty mechanism, the increase of the income penalty coefficient will promote the improvement of the fulfillment rate of the thermal coal contract, and the increase of the altruistic coefficient will reduce the fulfillment rate of the thermal coal contract. (3) Judging from the simulation results of grid company subsidies, with the increase of coal price, the subsidy price of grid companies, the on-grid tariff and subsidy coefficient after subsidies have all increased. In addition, the degree of integration of coal-fired power enterprises in Inner Mongolia, the corresponding subsidies for power grids are also different, which can be describe as the higher the degree of integration, the lower the grid subsidies. Therefore, when power grid companies subsidize power companies, they should first determine the degree of integration and make more reasonable subsidy decisions. Finally, based on the empirical analysis and simulation results analysis, the supply chain coordination proposals are proposed from the perspective of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Government and Inner Mongolia Coal and Electricity Enterprises. Key words，Inner Mongolia；coal-electricity supply chain；income distribution；Stackelberg model内蒙古工业大学硕士学位论文 V 目 录 摘要............................................................................................................................... .....II Abstract............................................................................................................................ .... III 目 录............................................................................................................................... .....V 第一章 绪论................................................................................................................... .....1 1.1 研究背景及意义 ..................................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 研究背景 .......................................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 研究意义 .......................................................................................................... 2 1.2 国内外研究综述 ..................................................................................................... 2 1.2.1 供应链协调研究 .............................................................................................. 2 1.2.2 煤电供应链协调研究 ...................................................................................... 4 1.2.3 相关研究方法 .................................................................................................. 5 1.2.4 研究现状总结 .................................................................................................. 6 1.3 研究内容、方法及研究框架 ................................................................................. 6 1.3.1 研究内容 .......................................................................................................... 6 1.3.2 研究方法 .......................................................................................................... 7 1.3.3 研究框架 .......................................................................................................... 8 1.4 本文创新点 ............................................................................................................. 9 第二章 相关理论综述................................................................................................... ...10 2.1 供应链管理 ........................................................................................................... 10 2.1.1 供应链 ............................................................................................................ 10 2.1.2 供应链管理 .................................................................................................... 11 2.2 供应链协调机制理论 ........................................................................................... 11 2.3 博弈论的相关理论概述 ....................................................................................... 12 第三章 内蒙古煤电供应链协调现状分析................................................................... ...14 3.1 中国煤电供应链协调现状分析 ........................................................................... 14 3.1.1 煤电产业发展现状 ........................................................................................ 14内蒙古工业大学硕士学位论文 VI 3.1.2 中国现有煤电供应链协调机制.................................................................... 16 3.2 内蒙古煤电企业供应链协调现状分析............................................................... 18 3.2.1 煤电企业发展现状........................................................................................ 18 3.2.2 煤电企业供应链协调现状............................................................................ 20 第四章 内蒙古煤电企业供应链协调机制研究........................................................... ... 24 4.1 模型理论简介....................................................................................................... 24 4.1.1Stackelberg 主从博弈 ..................................................................................... 24 4.1.2 收益分配合约模型........................................................................................ 25 4.2 模型的构建........................................................................................................... 26 4.2.1 相关定义及假设............................................................................................ 27 4.2.2 煤电企业收益分配机制模型........................................................................ 28 4.2.3 煤电企业长期契约信用机制模型................................................................ 31 4.2.4 电网公司补贴模型........................................................................................ 34 第五章 模拟仿真........................................................................................................... ... 37 5.1 相关参数赋值....................................................................................................... 37 5.2 模拟仿真............................................................................................................... 39 5.2.1 煤电企业收益分配仿真情况........................................................................ 39 5.2.2 煤电企业长期契约信用机制仿真情况........................................................ 43 5.2.3 电网公司补贴仿真情况................................................................................ 48 5.3 仿真结果分析....................................................................................................... 52 5.3.1 煤电企业收益分配........................................................................................ 52 5.3.2 煤电企业信用机制........................................................................................ 52 5.3.3 电网补贴........................................................................................................ 53 第六章 针对煤电供应链协调的对策建议................................................................... ... 54 6.1 基于企业角度....................................................................................................... 54 6.2 基于政府角度....................................................................................................... 54 结 论............................................................................................................................... ... 58