2
Particular attention went toward articles and reports that non-
Russian sources had fagged as false or misleading, as well as items
that achieved prominence through distribution beyond their origi-
nal source—for example, those that gained traction on social media
or inspired further media coverage.
In the aftermath of each event in Turkey, Russian media eforts
(defned here as approaches to crafting and disseminating narra-
tives) took the form of propaganda. Tis propaganda (defned here
as intentionally spread ideas, information, or claims, particularly
of a biased or misleading nature, that advance a desired message or
messages)1 involved a variety of strategies and techniques. Russian
media did not employ just one strategy or technique exclusively in
each case but rather used multiple, overlapping tools in combina-
tion. Nevertheless, Russian media eforts following each of the
three events, respectively, exemplify diferent primary propaganda
strategies. Te three primary strategies—amplifcation of genuine
uncertainty, creation of opportunistic fabrications, and use of mul-
tiple contradictory narratives—are explained as follows in relation
to the specifc events in which Russian media emphasized them:
Amplifcation of genuine uncertainty involves taking up
a topic that credible sources have identifed as a legitimate,
unresolved question. It entails adding a false claim to the con-
troversy to persuade audiences that the new claim is a compel-
ling, objective continuation of the debate already occuring in
trustworthy information sources. Tis approach is a concerted
infuence efort that aims to attract attention. Moreover, it
seeks to convince audiences that the new claim might be true
and that it therefore merits further discussion. Russian media’s
allegations of Turkish sponsorship of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) after the downing of the Russian plane dem-
onstrate this propaganda strategy.
Opportunistic fabrications are quick and deliberate responses
to events that falsely interpret the events that actually took
place. Tis is diferent from amplifcation of genuine uncer-
tainty, because the false narratives are more tactical: Tey do
not necessarily build on past reporting or attempt to convince
audiences of their veracity; rather, they just inject more fabrica-
tions into an environment full of falsehoods and suspicion.
Tis further contributes to a situation in which people do not
know what to believe. Tis approach aims to confuse audiences
and to fuel overall distrust of information sources. As Peter
Pomerantsev has noted regarding Russian propaganda, “it’s not
so much an information war, but a war on information.”2
Russian media’s generation of anti-U.S. conspiracy theories
and disinformation after the Turkish coup attempt demon-
strate this propaganda strategy.
Multiple contradictory narratives are inconsistent accounts
or explanations that each appeal to a diferent audience. Tese
narratives may be mutually exclusive, but they are still ofered
simultaneously to appeal to audiences of various persua-
Russian media efforts exemplify different primary propaganda strategies: amplifcation of
genuine uncertainty, creation of opportunistic fabrications, and use of multiple contradictory
narratives.sions and to make it seem as if the media source has carefully
considered many possibilities. Tis strategy may be meant to
infuence audiences to feel that the desired conclusions are
their own and prompt them to doubt the veracity of contrary
information. Te aim may be to distract audiences or dis-
suade them from believing an account or explanation that is
not
ofered as part of the array of narratives. Russian media’s
promotion of various insinuations of blame after the assassina-
tion of the Russian ambassador in Turkey demonstrate this
propaganda strategy.
Russian media eforts across all three cases, regardless of the
propaganda strategy employed, each supported overall Russian for-
eign policy aims as related to Turkey. Te principal Russian foreign
policy objectives that media eforts have supported include3
undermining NATO and fomenting mutual suspicion between
Turkey and its Western allies, particularly the United States
and the European Union
enlisting Ankara’s support and impeding its opposition to Rus-
sian actions in Eurasia and the Middle East
infuencing Turkish internal political developments to make
Turkey a more compliant partner.
Russian propaganda is a component of a broader, integrated
Russian pursuit of these objectives and of general leverage and
advantage. As a result, this analysis considers new media eforts
that correspond with these broader Russian pursuits to be part of
information operations.4
Te overall purpose of this piece is to promote understanding
of how Russia uses media tools to pursue its Turkey-related goals.
Tis assessment does not attempt to determine whether such media
activities were successful in infuencing audiences.5 Rather, it takes
the viewpoint that recognizing how and why Russia uses these tools
is necessary before it will be possible to evaluate the efectiveness of
these tools or counteract them. With this in mind, the following
sections describe the dynamics of Russian media responses to the
three events, highlighting the main propaganda strategy employed
in each case, the disinformation techniques used, and the foreign
policy objectives being pursued.
Amplifcation of Existing Uncertainty: Allegations
of Turkish Sponsorship of ISIS After Downing of
Russian Plane
Following Turkey’s November 24, 2015, shootdown of a Russian
Su-24 bomber that had entered Turkish airspace, Russian media
reports regarding Turkey—which in the months before the incident
had been more dispassionate—turned sharply against Turkey.6
Russian outlets began aggressively crafting narratives that por-
trayed Turkey and its leaders as supporters of terrorism that funded
ISIS through illegal oil purchases.
With these allegations, Russian media employed the propa-
ganda strategy of amplifying a genuine, preexisting uncertainty.
Specifcally, credible Western and Turkish domestic media sources
had earlier questioned Turkey’s commitment to counterterror-
ism, reporting that Ankara was not doing enough to stop foreign
fghters from transiting Turkey, that it was failing to crack down
on ISIS recruitment in Turkey, and that Turks were making money
through transshipment of oil from areas under ISIS control.7 An
April 2015 Congressional Research Service report had found that
the situation was complicated: ISIS did engage in oil smugglingthrough Turkey, but the Turkish government faced risks and difcul-
ties in combating this, and had nevertheless begun to crack down on
such operations after 2014.8 After the plane downing, Russian media
exploited, magnifed, and added to this legitimate prior discourse
and confusion. What was new was a concerted Russian efort to link
President Recep Tayyip Erdoan and his family to ISIS oil smug-
gling. Te accompanying tone of Russian reporting, which refected
personal grievances against Turkey, was also new.
Te new Russian media eforts and tone aligned with other
elements of the Russian response to the shootdown. President
Vladimir Putin decried the incident as a “stab in the back delivered
by the accomplices of terrorists.”9 Putin suggested that he saw this
act as a personal, as well as a political, afront given the close ties
he and Erdoan had developed over the years, and that Erdoan’s
policy in Syria was linked to the Turkish leader’s embrace of
radical Islam.10 Russia retaliated against this challenge in several
ways. First, it strengthened its air defenses in Syria to deter further
hostile actions by Turkish or NATO forces and undertook several
shows of force around Syria and Turkey. In addition, it took steps
to damage the Turkish economy, including placing an embargo
on many Turkish agricultural imports, restricting Russian tourism
to Turkey, ending visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, and halt-
ing construction of the TurkStream gas pipeline between the two
countries.
Alongside these measures, anti-Turkey media eforts in mul-
tiple languages called into question Turkey’s integrity and member-
ship in NATO, targeted Erdoan and his family, and glorifed Rus-
sia. Tey did so using several disinformation techniques, including
employing emotive language,11 ridiculing, making statements
without evidence, surrounding claims with misleading context, and
incorporating partial truths via selective use of information and
visuals.12 For example:
Russian television programs on state channel Rossiya 1
emphasized the theme that Turkish deceit and sponsorship of
terrorism disgraced both Turkey and the NATO alliance as
a whole.13 One Rossiya 1 news show “painted Turkey under
[Erdoan] as a country that backs Islamic State, openly allows
public calls to jihad, exports damaged and possibly carcino-
genic produce to Russia and has purposely unleashed a wave of
refugees into Europe as a ‘special operation.’”14
An English-language
RT
article on November 25, 2015—
among similar
RT
and
Sputnik
reports following the plane
incident—speculated that Turkish government ofcials, as well
as Erdoan’s son, Bilal Erdoan, were personally involved in
illegal oil trading.15 Yet the article ofered no actual proof to
connect Erdoan’s family with the oil trade. Instead, as context
for its claims, the article contained such details as a real
October 2014 quote from then–U.S. Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David
Cohen. Cohen had noted that it appeared that some ISIS oil
was being resold into Turkey, and that middlemen involved in
ISIS oil trade included some who were from Turkey. However,
the quote made no suggestion whatsoever of Turkish govern-
ment complicity. To provide additional context for its accusa-
Russian media employed the propaganda
strategy of amplifying a genuine, preexisting
uncertainty.tions, the
RT
article also included an embedded photo from
Twitter claiming to show Bilal Erdoan in an Istanbul restau-
rant with a purported Islamic State leader. Te photo caption
read, “Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son ‘BILAL ERDOGAN’ with
his ISIS brothers.”16 Te article also noted: “According to ana-
lysts, Russian airstrikes in Syria are disrupting the proftable
deals for Turkish middlemen, including Ankara ofcials.”17
Turkish-language
Sputnik
ran an
article on December 2,
2015, with the title “Russia: Erdoan and His Family Directly
Involved in ISIS’s Illegal Oil Shipment in Syria.”18 Te article
covered a Russian Defense Ministry news briefng orga-
nized by then–Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, Anatoly
Antonov. Narrated videos embedded in the text of the article
purported to show truck fow across Turkey’s border from
Iraq and Syria, supposedly proving that ISIS oil was being
smuggled to Turkey. Videos also depicted Russian airstrikes
as having disrupted ISIS oil trade. Among other quotes, the
article text included these remarks from Antonov: “Our goal
is not for Erdoan to resign, that is for the Turkish people to
decide,” and “Russian journalists are brave enough to tell the
truth about Turkey’s crimes.”19 In an English-dubbed
RT
video
from the briefng embedded in the article, Antonov remarked:
“nobody in the West asks the question why the president’s son
heads one of the leading energy companies and his son in law
is the Minister of Energy—what a wonderful family busi-
ness.”20 Nevertheless, neither the article nor the video provided
any actual evidence of Erdoan’s family being involved in ille-
gal oil trade with ISIS. Rather, Antonov urged other journalists
to investigate Russia’s claims.
Such reports exemplify the broader propaganda approach of
amplifying existing uncertainty, because they concentrated their
new accusations on a subject that non-Russian media had earlier
fagged as an area of true potential concern. International and Turk-
ish outlets had already indicated their interest in and willingness to
report on the topic of ISIS oil trade. As a December 2015
New Yorker
piece pointed out, “Te Russian defense ministry might have embar-
rassed Turkey in any number of accurate ways . . . . Instead, Russia
approached the nebulous topic of ISIS oil smuggling with radical
specifcity.”21 In focusing on this particular area of doubt and confu-
sion, Russian media may have sought to generate curiosity and fuel
further discussion beyond just Russian outlets.22
Indeed, the allegations did gain traction in Western sources,
which helped spread the Russian narrative. For instance, a
December 2, 2015, BBC article covered Putin’s allegations that
Turkey had shot down the Russian plane in order to protect its
oil trade. It also described the Russian Defense Ministry’s claims
that Erdoan’s family conducted oil business with ISIS.23 Despite
International and Turkish outlets had already indicated their interest in and willingness to
report on the topic of ISIS oil trade . . . . In focusing on this particular area of doubt and
confusion, Russian media may have sought to generate curiosity and fuel further discussion
beyond just Russian outlets.。