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MBA论文_股权激励契约要素与企业绩效关系的实证研究

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文本描述
Abstract
II
ABSTRACT
Equity incentives grant employees some stocks of the company, sharing them a part of
profit from the company so that employees could be motivated to work hard to achieve the goal
of the company’s shareholders. As a contractual arrangement, the design of equity incentive
contract elements will directly determine the implementation effect. Therefore, this paper studies
the effect of equity incentives from the perspective of equity incentive contract elements through
empirical tests about the relationship between equity incentive contract elements and company
performance, so as to enrich the related theoretical system of equity incentives and provide
useful reference for Chinese listed companies in designing equity incentive plans.
First of all, this article clarifies the research background related to equity incentives and
proposes the research topics of this paper. It reviews and sorts out relevant domestic and foreign
literatures on the relationship between the various elements of equity incentives and company
performance, and forms the framework and research content of this paper. Besides, the related
concepts of equity incentives are defined and analyzed theoretically. The meanings of equity
incentives, corporate performance, and equity incentive contract elements are introduced. The
principal-agent theory, human capital theory, optimal contract theory, and executive power
theory are introduced. The analysis of theories discussed the effect and mechanism of the equity
incentive mechanism. Afterwards, this article analyzes the development status of equity
incentives, and selects non-financial listed companies that have implemented equity incentive
plans during 2011-2016 as samples, and analyzes the current status of equity incentives through
sample characteristics: The industry is concentrated in the manufacturing and information
technology industries. Non-state-owned holding companies account for 89% of the total. The
intensity of incentives is low and they are still declining. The incentive period is short and the
incentive targets are concentrated in core employees rather than senior executives, the restricted
stock model began to dominate the mainstream. Finally, this paper empirically examines the
relationship between the equity incentive intensity, the distribution structure of incentive objects,
the validity of incentives and company performance, and considers the equity incentive model,
the actual controller, and company growth as the adjustment variables.
The results show that: there is a cubic curve relationship that increases first, then decreases,
and then increases between the senior management shareholdings and company performance.
There is a significant negative correlation between the ratio of equity incentives intensity and
company performance. The actual controller and the equity incentive mode have a grouping
effect on the relationship between equity incentives intensity and the company performance. The
growth of the company does not have a regulatory effect on the relationship between the
shareholding ratio of senior executives and company performance, but it has a regulatory effect
on the relationship between the ratio of incentives intensity and company performance.
High-growth companies can suppress the negative effect proportion of the ratio of incentives
intensity for performance.The relationship between the equity incentive objects distribution
structure and company performance shows a three-fold curve relationship that decreases first,
then increases, and then decreases. There is no significant correlation between the incentive
validity of incentives and company performance. Based on this, this paper puts forward six
policy suggestions: selecting moderate incentive intensity, considering more restrictive stock
Abstract
III
models, perfecting corporate governance mechanisms, triggering equity incentives from
corporate conditions, and formulating a scientific performance evaluation system.
Keywords: Equity incentive; Incentive Intensity;Incentive Object; Incentive Validity;
Company Performance
目录
IV
目录
摘 要 .. I
ABSTRACT . II
目录 ......... IV
第一章 绪论 . 1
1.1研究背景和意义 ......... 1
1.1.1研究背景 ......... 1
1.1.2 研究意义 ......... 2
1.2国内外相关文献综述 ..... 3
1.2.1国外相关文献综述 . 3
1.2.2 国内相关文献综述 . 5
1.2.3 文献述评 ......... 8
1.3研究内容和思路 ......... 9
1.4研究方法和创新之处 .... 10
第二章 相关概念的界定和理论基础 ....... 12
2.1 股权激励的相关概念 .... 12
2.1.1 股权激励 ........ 12
2.1.2 企业绩效 ........ 12
2.1.3 股权激励契约要素12
2.2 股权激励的理论基础 .... 14
2.2.1 委托代理理论 .... 14
2.2.2 人力资本理论 .... 14
2.2.3 激励理论 ........ 15
2.2.4 最优契约理论 .... 15
2.2.5 高管权力理论 .... 16
2.3 本章小结 .. 16
第三章 我国上市公司股权激励的现状分析 ....... 18
3.1 我国上市公司股权激励的发展历程和现状 .......... 18
3.1.1 我国上市公司股权激励的发展历程 .......... 18
3.1.2 股权激励近年来的发展现状 .... 20
3.2 样本选择和数据来源 .... 21
3.3样本特征分析 .......... 21
3.3.1 行业分布 ........ 21
3.3.2 股权性质 ........ 22
目录
V
3.3.3 发行激励总数占总股本比例 ... 23
3.3.4 高管持股比例 ... 24
3.3.5 激励模式 ....... 25
3.3.6 激励有效期 ..... 26
3.3.7 激励对象分布结构 ........... 27
3.3.8 其他特征 ....... 27
3.4 本章小结 . 28
第四章 股权激励契约要素与企业绩效的实证分析 ....... 30
4.1 假设提出 . 30
4.2 变量设定 . 32
4.3 实证分析 . 34
4.3.1 相关性分析 ..... 34
4.3.2 股权激励强度与绩效的回归分析 ........... 35
4.3.3 激励对象分布结构、激励有效期与绩效的回归分析 ....... 42
4.4 稳健性检验 ........... 43
4.5 本章小结 . 44
第五章 结论与展望 ........... 46
5.1结论与启示 ........... 46
5.2 政策建议 . 47
5.3 不足与展望 ........... 49
致谢 ......... 50
参考文献 ..... 51
附录A: 作者在校期间发表的论文 ....... 54
附录B: 相关数据 ........... 55。。。。。。