首页 > 资料专栏 > 地区 > 其他国家 > 美国 > 兰德_恢复美国的电力投射能力(英文)2018.7_15页

兰德_恢复美国的电力投射能力(英文)2018.7_15页

迈兰dex***
V 实名认证
内容提供者
热门搜索
资料大小:171KB(压缩后)
文档格式:WinRAR
资料语言:中文版/英文版/日文版
解压密码:m448
更新时间:2019/8/3(发布于上海)

类型:积分资料
积分:25分 (VIP无积分限制)
推荐:升级会员

   点此下载 ==>> 点击下载文档


文本描述
2 Underwriting a Strategy of Leadership In the aftermath of World War II, a broad consensus emergedamong Americans that the nation could no longer accept the risksof a strategy that eschewed engagement in the security afairs ofkey parts of Eurasia. History’s most destructive confict showedthat the security and well-being of Americans could only be assuredthrough active engagement abroad and that a priority goal of thatengagement had to be to ensure that no powerful hegemon gaineddominance over the Eurasian landmass.3 With the adoption by theSoviet Union of a hostile, militarized, and expansionist approachto international relations, implementing this strategy led to theadoption by Washington of a strategy of containment by means ofa U.S.-led Western alliance. Tat strategy featured the forward sta- tioning of upward of 500,000 U.S. military personnel abroad. Overtime, the U.S. military alliances with the industrialized democra- cies evolved into a dense web of relationships that encompassedpolitical, economic, technological, and cultural dimensions. Tat strategy of engagement and leadership survived thecollapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. By theearly 1990s, it was widely recognized that, in an increasingly inter- dependent world, Americans could not hope to achieve securityand prosperity at home without the ability to infuence actors andshape events abroad. Whether the goal is to protect Americansfrom terrorist threats, to limit the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, to ensure adherence to fair trade practices, or toprotect the environment, real progress will require the participa- tion and support of a broad range of international actors. No state,no matter how powerful, can achieve these objectives unilaterally.Given the continued global difusion of knowledge, technol- ogy, wealth, and other instruments of agency, and the increasingconnectedness of the global economy, this reality is not going tochange. It is not unreasonable, then, to expect that U.S. nationalsecurity strategy will continue to be animated by the realiza- tion that no realistic alternative to international engagement andleadership exists, rhetoric touting an “America frst” approachnotwithstanding.4 Under these circumstances, what sort of armed forces shouldthe United States have Te frst strategic priority should be tomaintain peace and stability in regions where the nation has impor- tant interests and alliance commitments that are under stress: EastAsia and Europe. Tis means that the frst military priority is toensure the viability of key alliances and to prevent any state withinterests hostile to those of the United States and its allies fromgaining a position of overwhelming dominance in those regions.5In practical terms, this means today that U.S. forces must be pos- tured to deter aggression by China, Russia, and North Korea and,Whether the goal is to protect Americans from terrorist threats, to limit the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, to ensure adherence to fair trade practices, or to protect theenvironment, real progress will require the participation and support of a broad range ofinternational actors. 3 in conjunction with allies and partners, to defeat such aggressionshould deterrence fail.6 In addition to deterring and defeating large-scale aggression bystate adversaries, U.S. forces must also continue, for the indefnitefuture, their campaign against violent extremist organizations, suchas ISIS and al Qaeda, that have the potential to attack U.S. citizensor to destabilize countries or regions of importance to U.S. inter- ests. As the fght to date against terrorist groups shows, long-termsuccess depends on keeping the group’s leaders and networks underunrelenting pressure and building the capabilities of local forcesand governments. Much of the campaign against such groupswill involve fnancial, intelligence, diplomatic, and informationalinstruments. But the U.S. armed forces play crucial roles in train- ing, advising, and assisting partner governments in counteringterrorists and in conducting direct attacks, when appropriate. U.S.special operations forces play a leading role here, but they oftenrequire transportation, logistics, and other types of support fromthe general-purpose forces. Finally, U.S. forces are called upon to protect the United Statesitself from attack. Under normal circumstances, this means keep- ing the national missile defense system and elements of the strategicnuclear forces on alert, being prepared to intercept airborne threatsfrom hostile powers or terrorists, and assisting the Department ofHomeland Security in monitoring the nation’s borders. Tis is a very demanding set of missions. Fighting and win- ning major wars on the territory of distant countries or in their“backyards” is particularly daunting, but this is what the bulk ofAmerica’s armed forces have been trained and equipped to do sinceWorld War II. At present and for the foreseeable future,the UnitedStates alone has the military wherewithal to project large-scale militaryforces over intercontinental distances and conduct sustained militaryoperations across a broad range of mission sets . Tis capability isessential in order to ofset major imbalances in military power andto sustain the United States’ role as the security partner of choicefor like-minded states. Without it, the credibility of the U.S. deter- rent and of U.S. alliance commitments would erode, as would U.S.power and infuence. Unfavorable Trends In the post–Cold War period, the ability of U.S. forces, in conjunc- tion with allies, to defeat aggression by the forces of its regionaladversaries—states such as Iraq, Serbia, and Libya—was unques- tioned. U.S. and allied forces repeatedly demonstrated that, inconficts against these adversaries, they could quickly seize theinitiative; dominate military operations in the air, at sea, on land,in space, and in cyberspace; and achieve their campaign objectivesswiftly. Tis military dominance yielded strategic benefts, not onlyhelping to deter challenges to the U.S.-led global order, but alsoserving as the “glue” that held together coalitions of like-mindedAt present and for the foreseeable future,the United States alone has the militarywherewithal to project large-scale militaryforces over intercontinental distances andconduct sustained military operations acrossa broad range of mission sets. 4 states that promoted common action on a wide range of interna- tional issues. Unfortunately, the era of unquestioned U.S. military superior- ity has not persisted. A variety of factors are responsible for this.First, the vision profered by the United States and other demo- cratically governed states of societies run according to pluralisticnorms and free market economies has not (yet) proven sufcientlycompelling to prompt signifcant and lasting change in many coun- tries. Authoritarian elites in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, andother states see it as being in their interest to fan historically basedanimosities toward neighboring states and groups and to challengeelements of the U.S.-led international and regional orders.7 In sup- port of these strategies of opposition, the military establishments ofthese states have closely studied U.S. power projection operationssince Operation Desert Storm (ODS), with an eye toward fnd- ing ways to thwart potential U.S. military interventions in theirregions. To varying degrees, their eforts have borne fruit (as will bediscussed later). At the same time, the United States and many of its closest allieshave, since 2001, invested considerable human and material resourcesin eforts to stabilize the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq and tocounter violent extremist groups elsewhere that are deemed to posethreats to citizens of the United States and of its allies. Te ensuingoperations have been a drain on attention, money, and patience ata time when economic constraints have limited defense spending.Training for large-scale power projection operations against highlycapable adversaries has also sufered. As one result, the armed forcesof the United States today, like those of many of its allies, are facedwith feets of aging platforms, the need to rebuild training and readi- ness for high-end combat operations, and inadequate funding for thetypes of modern weapons and systems needed to meet the challengesposed by their most capable adversaries.8China and Russia pose the most far-reaching challenges.Both have invested heavily in capabilities intended to disrupt U.S.deployments to their regions, impose heavy attrition on forces thatdo deploy forward and prevent those forces from conducting high- tempo operations, and protect their own forces and territories fromattack. Teir goal is twofold: (1) to raise the costs and risks of aprospective military intervention to a level that could deter a futureU.S. leader from responding forcefully to aggression, and, failingthat, (2) to hold U.S. military power at arm’s length for a period oftime sufcient to allow that aggression to achieve its primary aims,confronting the United States and its allies with afait accomplithatwould be difcult and costly to reverse. Key capabilities supporting these anti-access area denial(A2/AD) strategies are highlighted below: Long-range, accurate missiles. Both China and Russia areinvesting heavily in conventionally armed, precision-guided bal- listic and cruise missiles that have sufcient accuracy to destroyeven hardened facilities. Tese weapons bear little resemblance tothe dozens of inaccurate Scud missiles that Iraq hurled at coali- Both China and Russia are investing heavilyin conventionally armed, precision-guidedballistic and cruise missiles that havesuffcient accuracy to destroy even hardenedfacilities.5 tion forces during ODS, few of which landed anywhere near theirintended targets. And China today has thousands of these modernmissiles. As a consequence, U.S. forces on land and at sea in a warwith either of these adversaries would be subject to being attackedbefore they ever launched a weapon of their own at the enemy.DoD is investing in active defense systems, such as Patriot, theTerminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, andsea-based SM-3 missiles to shoot down ballistic and cruise missiles,but these defensive systems are expensive, take time to deploy, andcan be overwhelmed and destroyed by large salvos of attackingmissiles.9 Reconnaissance and targeting systems. Chinese and Russianlong-range strike systems are supported by increasingly sophis- ticated means for detecting, identifying, and tracking targets.Both countries have deployed constellations of surveillance satel- lites, manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance platforms,land-based over-the-horizon radars, sophisticated command andcontrol networks, and other systems that can allow their forces todetermine where concentrations of enemy forces are throughout theregion and to direct strikes against them in near-real time. Russianforces in Ukraine have demonstrated high degrees of profciencyat using a variety of tactical reconnaissance systems, includingunmanned aerial vehicles, to locate and target troop concentra- tions, rapidly directing heavy and accurate artillery fre on them. Integrated air defenses. China and Russia have felded densearrays of modern long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systemsto protect priority regions of their territories and waters. Te newestof these systems have ranges of 400 kilometers or more.10 At theseranges, U.S. airborne platforms have difculties in reconnoiter- ing the battlespace and engaging key mobile targets, includingthe SAM systems themselves. Tese SAMs are complemented byfeets of increasingly modern fghter aircraft. Fifteen years ago,China’s combat air force was composed of obsolescent aircraft of1950s and 1960s vintages. Today, a very substantial portion of thatforce—900 aircraft, including Su-27/30/35 and J-10 variants—aredeemed roughly comparable in range, payload, and aerodynamicperformance to the fourth-generation F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18sthat make up the bulk of U.S. fghter inventories.11 Te Russian airforce has similar capabilities. Both countries’ air forces have alsofown prototypes of fghter aircraft with ffth-generation stealthcharacteristics. Tese developments mean that it would take moretime and cost more lives and aircraft for U.S. forces to gain airsuperiority than has been the case in any confict since the end ofthe Cold War.12 Te fght for information superiority. China’s military doc- trine recognizes the central role that information and rapid decision- making play in modern, complex military operations. Accordingly,China’s armed forces are investing heavily in capabilities to protecttheir information assets and to degrade those of their adversaries.In a confict with China or Russia, U.S. forces should expect thattheir command centers and databases will be subjected to intensecyber attacks. Space-based and airborne sensors will also be subjectto attack by electronic jamming and by kinetic means. Te commu- In a confict with China or Russia, U.S. forcesshould expect that their command centersand databases will be subjected to intensecyberattacks. 。。。。。。