首页 > 资料专栏 > 论文 > 财税论文 > 股票证券论文 > 上市公司定向增发中的利益输送问题研究_MBA毕业论文DOC

上市公司定向增发中的利益输送问题研究_MBA毕业论文DOC

资料大小:593KB(压缩后)
文档格式:DOC
资料语言:中文版/英文版/日文版
解压密码:m448
更新时间:2018/12/23(发布于江苏)

类型:金牌资料
积分:--
推荐:升级会员

   点此下载 ==>> 点击下载文档


文本描述
摘要
2015 年 A 股市场股权再融资金额为 13878.10 亿元,当年共有 857 家上市公
司在 A 股市场完成定向增发,实际募集资金 13723.08 亿元,占股权再融资金额
的 98.88%,可见在我国资本市场上,定向增发已成为上市公司股权再融资的首
选方式。定向增发亦成为理论界和资本市场关注的焦点,也得到了广大中小投资
者及机构投资者的追捧。但是在定向增发过程中,控股股东和中小股东的利益是
否具有一致性呢,控股股东是否会利用其控制权优势和信息不对称优势进行利益
输送呢,控股股东是怎样进行利益输送呢,这种利益输送是否会损害中小股东的
利益。本文将针对这些问题展开研究

本文选取2016年TBB定向增发新股收购控股股东等关联方资产的案例为研
究对象。本次交易发生在控股股东及关联方丁鸿敏等成为 DY 网络的实际控制人
后,其注入的资产评估增值率高达 5008.44%,且交易对价全部采用股份支付,
在控股股东进行“自我交易”的情况下,控股股东很可能在定向增发中进行利益
输送。通过理论分析和案例分析相结合的方式,本文将探究我国上市公司在定向
增发股份购买股权这一过程中利益输送的操作方式和流程,透过案例的表象看到
问题的本质,将理论应用于实践。本文分为五个章节,内容如下:
第一章为引言。本章分为三个部分,分别介绍本文问题的研究背景和意义、
研究思路和框架以及研究方法和创新点

第二章为文献综述。本章以本文研究的问题为主线,笔者搜集归纳整理了国
内外学者有关定向增发和利益输送研究的相关文献,最后进行了评述,以便为本
文研究的问题提供理论分析和支持

第三章为我国定向增发状况和利益输送问题理论分析。本章包含两个部分,
第一部分为我国上市公司定向增发制度、背景与现状,介绍了上市公司定向增发
政策的演变及对三种融资方式政策、规模加以对比;第二部分阐述了本文分析中
所涉及到的三个重要理论,分别为产权理论、委托代理理论和信息不对称理论

第四章为 TBB 收购 DY 网络案例分析。本章主要分析了控股股东在定向增
发过程中进行利益输送的方式,包括操纵定向增发新股发行价格分析、注入资产
的估值分析、定向增发后实施丰厚的现金股利分红以及操控非公允关联交易,最
后进行了案例总结。笔者认为控股股东利用其控股权优势和信息不对称优势,在定向增发中通过以上四种方式向其输送利益,损害了中小股东的权益

第五章为研究的结论、政策性建议及未来展望。本章主要是得出本案例的研
究结论,并据此提出政策性建议,说明研究的不足及对下一步的研究提出展望

本文研究得出如下结论:控股股东操纵下的定向增发在实践中和理论上都有
利益输送的极大嫌疑。TBB 实施的这一定向增发并没有像其公告中所承诺的不
会损害中小股东的利益,反而成了控股股东掏空上市公司向自身进行利益输送的
工具。TBB 的控股股东通过操纵定向增发新股的发行价格、注入高溢价的评估
资产、定向增发后的“大手笔”股利分红和操控非公充关联交易,致使上市公司
的利益转移到控股股东及关联方的口袋里,损害了中小股东投资者的利益

通过对个案和问题的研究,在理论上,揭示了控股股东及其并联方凭借定向
增发从上市公司进行利益输送的具体方式和过程,将拓展和加深委托代理理论的
内涵和外延的研究,丰富定向增发中利益输送的理论解释。在现实中,能够为资
本监管部门等完善重大资产重组制度、预防控股股东的利益输送和保护中小股东
的利益提供政策性建议

关键词: 控股股东;定向增发;利益输送;3
Abstract
The Secondary Equity Of fering for A-share market reaches to an a mount of
13878.10 billion yuan in 2015, when a total of 857 com panies in the A-share market
have completed directed additional and th e actual financing is 13723.08 billion yuan
accounting for 98.88% of the Secondary Equity Offering. It is clear that the directed
additional has become the main way for the Secondary Equity Offering in the quoted
company in capital market of China. The directed additional has become the focus in
the academia and capital markets, and also been paid much attention by a majority of
small and medium investors and institu tional investors. However, in the process of
directed additional, there are many issues to be discussed. For example, whether the
interests between the controlling shareholder and the small and medium shareholders
is consistent, W hether the controlling shar eholder will carry out the transfer of
benefits using its control advantage and information asymmetry, and how the transfer
of benefits is conducted by the controlling sh areholder, and whether this transfer of
benefits will damage the interests of s mall and medium shareholders. Hence, this
study will treat those issues.
Here, the directed additional of Bunny (002043) in 2016 is chosen as an example
to conduct the study . The tran saction occurred in the pe riod after the controlling
shareholder has become the actual control of the counterpart. The value-added of the
injection assets by the controlling shareholder Ding Hongmin is up to 5008.44%, and
the transaction price is paid by the shares completed. In the case of self-dealing by
the controlling shareholder, the co ntrolling shareholder is likely to carry out the
interest transfer in the process of the directed additional. Through the combination of
theoretical analysis and case analysis, this paper will examine the operation mode and
process of the interest transfer in the directed additional and assets reorganization pf
the quoted company in China. This study tr ies to find the nature of the problem
through the appearance of the case and apply the coressponding theory to the practice.
This article is organized by five chapters as follows:4
The first chapter is the introduction. This chapter is divided into three parts,
which introduce the background and significa nce of this research, the ideas and
framework as well as the research methods of this paper, respectively.
The chapter 2 is the rev iew of the literatures. This chapter focuses on the theory
of interest distribution in the directed additional, the transfer interest and the interest
transmission. At last, a comm ent is made to provide a theoretical support for the
research of this paper.
The chapter 3 is the theoretical analysis of the problem of interest delivery in the
directed additional. This chapter is divided into two parts, the first part discusses the
system of the directed additional, background and current situation of the quoted
company, and also introduces the evolution of policy in directed additiona of quoted
companies, then the three financing methods and their scales are compared. The other
part involves the analy sis of the th ree important theories, i.e., the pro perty rights
theory, the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory.
The chapter 4 treats a case study of bunny acquisition win - win network. This
chapter mainly analyzes the ways in whic h the controlling shareholder can carry out
the interest transmission in the process of directed additional, including the selection
of the timing of the allocation of directed additional, the in jection of high prem ium
assessment assets, the implementation of the rich cash dividend dividends and the
manipulation of non-fair related transactions. Finally, I obtain a conclusion from this
case, that is, the controlling shareholder of the use of its controlling interests and
information asymmetry advantages in the priv ate placement through the above four
ways to tra nsport their interests, and ef fectively damage the interests of sm all
shareholders.
The chapter 5 is the c onclusion of the research, policy recomm endations and
future prospects. This chapter mainly summarizes the research of this paper, proposes
the policy suggestions, analyzes the shortcom ings of the research and prospects for
the future research.
In this paper, the following conclusions are drawn: there is benefit transfer in the5
directed additional under the control of the controlling shareholder in both the practice
and the theory. this directional additional implemented by the Bunny will harm the
interests of small shareholders which is no t the cas e as tha t promised in the
announcement, and also becom es the tools which is used vt the controlling
shareholder of the quoted com panies to transport their own interests. Bunny&39; s
controlling shareholder seriously dam aged the inte rests of small and m edium
shareholders investors by m anipulating the issue price of n ew shares, injecting high
premium assessment of assets, and privating placement after the generous dividend
dividends as well as manipulating the non-public affiliated transactions.
Through the study of the case and the proble m in this paper . Theoretically, it
reveals the specific way and process in whic h the controlling shareholders carry out
the interest transmission from the quoted company through the directional additional.
it will expand and deepen the connotation and extension of the principal-agent theory,
and also enrich the theo retical explanation of interest transmission in the directional
additional. In prac
。。。以上简介无排版格式,详细内容请下载查看