摘要
作为契约不完备性的产物，在职消费可能是对高管的隐性激励。但是，媒体
频频曝光的“天价烟酒”、“天价名片”等诸多事实表明，在职消费远超出了合
理范围，会带来不利经济后果，成为股东与高管之间代理冲突的重要表现形式之
一。如何有效抑制高管过度在职消费行为是董事会职责的重要内容。以往文献一
度以独立董事的治理结果代表董事会治理效果，较少关注其他类别的董事。事实
上，我国上市公司董事会成员包括执行董事、独立董事和非执行董事三类，直接
由股东派驻的非执行董事相对于内部管理者可能更独立，在监督治理过程中不易
受到高管的牵制。非执行董事是否同独立董事一样提高董事会独立性、监督高管，
从而约束高管机会主义行为、缓解委托代理冲突是本文的研究重点

基于以往研究，本文从高管在职消费角度研究非执行董事与独立董事的监督
治理作用，同时比较非执行董事与独立董事的治理效果。在此基础上，本文进一
步探索不同股权性质或不同股权制衡度情形下，非执行董事与独立董事对高管在
职消费的监督治理。本文选取 2009-2013 年我国沪市 A 股上市公司为样本，运用
SPSS 软件进行多元线性回归检验研究假设。实证结果表明，高管在职消费与非
执行董事比例呈负相关关系，而高管在职消费与独立董事比例呈正相关关系，说
明非执行董事能够抑制高管在职消费，独立董事没有发挥预期作用，反而加大了
高管在职消费程度，且非执行董事对高管在职消费的治理效果优于独立董事。研
究还发现，相比在国有公司中，在非国有公司中非执行董事对高管在职消费的监
督作用更明显，在股权制衡度高时非执行董事对高管在职消费的监督抑制作用更
明显；在国有公司或股权制衡度低的公司中，高管在职消费水平与独立董事比例
的相关关系显著为正

本文深入分析董事会结构和独立性，从新的视角丰富了董事会治理效果的经
验证据。本文的研究也为我国政府监管机构、上市公司进一步完善公司治理结构、
缓解代理冲突及降低代理成本提供新的思路和启示

关键词：董事会，非执行董事，独立董事，在职消费，代理冲突II
Research on the Effect of Non-executive Directors and
Independent Directors on Perquisite Consumption
Abstract
As a product of incomplete contracts, perquisite consumption may be a way of implicit
incentives for executives. However, many facts that there are frequent exposures of the costly
alcohol, cigarette or business card on media, show that perquisite consumption is far from
reasonable scope and is bad for companies, finally it becomes a main form of agency conflict
between shareholders and executives. How to effectively control excessive executive perquisite
consumption is the primary duty of the board of directors. Researchers invariably take the
governance result of independent directors as the governance effect of the whole board of
directors in the past literature, while pay less attention to other types of directors. Actually, there
are three types of directors on the board of directors in Chinese listed companies, including
executive directors, independent directors and non-executive directors. Non-executive directors
who are delegated by the shareholders, are more independent relative to the internal managers and
are not easy to loss independence in the process of supervision. The main focus of this paper is
whether non-executive directors as well as independent directors could improve the independence
and governance of the board, and then supervise executives and constrain the opportunism
behaviors of executives, finally ease principal-agent conflict.
Based on the formal literature, this paper researches the monitoring effect of non-executive
directors and independent directors simultaneously from executive perquisite consumption
perspective, and compares the monitoring effect of both types of directors. Furthermore, this paper
investigates the monitoring effect of both types of directors when the company is a
non-state-owned one or state-owned one by grouping regression, or whether the first big
shareholder is under equity restriction or not by grouping regression. With the evidence from the
Chinese A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange during 2009 and 2013, and this
paper uses SPSS software for multiple linear regression method and examines the theoretical
hypothesis. The empirical study results show that there is negative correlation between executive
perquisite consumption and the proportion of non-executive directors, while positive correlation
between perquisite consumption and the proportion of independent directors, which meansIII
non-executive directors could monitor executive perquisite consumption, while independent
directors don’t show the expected effect on executive perquisite consumption, but worsens
executive perquisite consumption. In addition, non-executive directors’ monitoring effect is better
than independent directors’. The research also shows, comparing to a state-owned company, when
it is a non-state-owned company non-executive directors can supervise perquisite consumption
more effectively, and non-executive directors can supervise perquisite consumption more
effectively when the first shareholder relatively controls a company. However, when it is a
state-owned company or when the first shareholder absolutely controls a company, there is clearer
positive correlation between executive perquisite consumption and the proportion of independent
directors.
This paper presents an in-deep analysis on the structure and independence of the board of
directors, and enriches the empirical evidence of the monitoring effect of the board from a new
perspective. In addition, this paper provides certain enlightenment and reference for our
government regulators and China’s companies to improve the governance structure of corporate,
ease principal-agent conflict and reduce the agency costs effectively.
Key words: the board of directors, non-executive directors, independent
directors, perquisite consumption, agency conflict目 录
中文摘要......I
Abstract....II
第一章 绪论..........1
1.1 研究背景与研究意义1
1.1.1 研究背景........1
1.1.2 研究意义........2
1.2 研究思路与方法........3
1.2.1 研究思路........3
1.2.2 研究方法........5
1.3 研究内容与创新点....5
1.3.1 研究内容........5
1.3.2 创新点6
第二章 文献综述. 7
2.1 概念界定........7
2.1.1 相关董事概念7
2.1.2 在职消费........8
2.2 董事治理效果的相关研究....9
2.2.1 独立董事治理效果的相关研究........9
2.2.2 非执行董事治理效果的相关研究..12
2.3 在职消费的相关研究..........14
2.3.1 在职消费的成因......14
2.3.2 在职消费的影响因素相关研究......15
2.3.3 在职消费的经济后果相关研究......18
2.4 文献述评......19第三章 制度背景和理论基础...21
3.1 制度背景
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