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本文针对后股权分置时期家族企业隧道行为问题，从终极控制者的角度出发，综合家族
企业内部治理和外部环境特征，探讨终极控制者的隧道行为，对于家族企业内部治理的
规范、企业价值的提升以及资本市场的健康发展均具有良好的理论意义和应用价值
本文以终极控制者隧道行为问题为核心，通过梳理归纳国内外关于隧道行为的文献
研究，对研究现状中存在的缺陷和不足积累系统的认识，进一步针对家族企业的内部治
理和外部环境对于隧道行为的影响因素进行理论分析，在此基础上构建固定效应模型进
行实证研究，后构建多元回归模型从所有权两面性角度对隧道行为与控制权结构的关系
的合理性深入验证。最后从家族企业内外部两大角度出发针对性的进行隧道行为制约机
制设计
本文主要研究内容和结论如下：
1、隧道行为相关文献梳理及比较分析：在搜索并查阅大量国内外文献资料和研究
成果的基础上，将国内外关于隧道行为的研究归纳整理成三大层面：隧道行为表现方式，
控股权、股权结构与隧道行为，法律制度环境与隧道行为，经系统地比较分析后总结出
目前国内外研究中所存在的不足，进而为本文拓展创新奠定基石
2、隧道行为影响因素特征剖析及识别：本文研究突破了以往研究主要集中于内部
治理因素与隧道行为关系层面的局限性，而综合分析了家族企业内部治理、外部环境中
极大可能影响终极控制者隧道行为的特征因素，并识别出金字塔股权结构、股权制衡度、
董事会治理、监事会治理、四委会健全程度、中介机构监督、市场化进程、法律制度环
境八大影响因素进一步开展分析研究
3、家族企业终极控制者隧道行为实证分析：针对家族企业内外部环境特征因素与
隧道行为进行实证分析，结果表明：（1）家族企业终极控制者的控制权水平与隧道行
为存在非线性关系；（2）终极控制者两权分离度与隧道行为呈现负相关关系但并不显
著；（3）在股权制衡度上，第二至第十大股东的总体持股比例与隧道侵占程度正相关
但不显著，机构投资者的持股比例与隧道行为呈显著负相关；（4）董事会治理上，独
立董事的占比与隧道行为呈现正相关但不显著；（5）监事会治理上，监事会的规模与摘要终极控制者的隧道行为呈现负相关但不显著；（6）四委会健全程度上，四委会设置个
数与隧道行为呈显著正相关；（7）外部环境影响因素上，地区市场化水平与隧道行为
呈现显著的负向影响，中介机构监督及地区法制化水平均未能对终极控制者隧道行为产
生抑制作用
4、家族企业终极控制者隧道行为制约对策研究：基于实证研究结果和理论分析，
从家族企业内外部多主体多角度针对性设计隧道行为制约机制，为促进我国家族企业内
部治理的完善与规范，推进市场主体的监管质量与效率，增强资本市场的良性互动与发
展提供一定的借鉴与参考
关键词：家族企业；终极控制者；隧道行为；两面性；制约机制AbstractAbstract
Since the Asian financial crisis broke out in the late twentieth century, the conflicts of
interest between the ultimate controller and minority shareholders have attracted the attention
of scholars. Via pyramid ownership structure, interlocking shareholding, dual holding,
preferred voting rights or other ways, the ultimate controller of the enterprise can construct
hidden path to excavate recessive resources of listed companies against listed companies and
small shareholders. Pyramid equity structure is the main equity structure in China&39;s family
businesses. During the family businesses’ governance, ultimate controller has greater
ownership with the pyramid holding, and makes key influence to management by stretching
family network. Ultimate controller has the ability to occupy resources of listed companies
and seeks control benefits. Nowadays, conflicts of interests between the ultimate controller
and minority shareholders occur usually under the background of imperfect legal system .
Although three years of reform of non-tradable shares solves the circulation problem of shares,
it is failed to inhibit the controlling shareholders’expropriation motivation. In the condition of
full circulation, the ultimate controller of listed companies is more likely to increase the
mining resources and tunnel behavior is more subtle owe to smaller occupation cost . Aimed
at family businesses’ tunneling problem of the period of post split share structure, starting
from the angle of ultimate control, the paper explores the tunneling behavior of ultimate
control based on internal governance and external environment characteristics of family
businesses. It promotes internal governance and enterprises value for family business, and
meanwhile the healthy development of capital market.
Based on the tunneling behavior of ultimate controllers as the core, the paper
summarizes domestic and foreign literature research about tunneling behavior, accumulates a
systematic understanding of the defects and deficiencies in the current research status. It
makes further theoretical analysis according to the factors of internal governance and external
environment of family business impact on the tunneling behavior, and constructs fixed effects
model empirical research on the basis of analysis theory, and then establishes the regression
model to confirm the rationality between tunneling and control from from the perspective of
ownership’s double effect . Finally, from the two angles of the inside and outside of the family
business, the paper designs the tunnel behavior restriction mechanisms.
The main contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:
1. Literature review of tunneling behavior and comparative analysis: based on consulting
a lot of domestic and foreign documents, the domestic and foreign literature studies on tunnel
behavior summarized into three levels: the tunnel manifestation mode, ownership level,
ownership structure and tunneling behavior, legal system environment and tunneling behavior.
Through systematic comparative analysis, carry out innovative research after summarizing the
deficiencies existing in the research at home and abroad.
2. Analysis and identification of factors for tunneling: this paper breaks through the
limitation of research focused on the relationship between the level of internal governance
factors and tunneling behavior, and makes a comprehensive analysis of factors that may affectAbstractgreatly the ultimate control of tunneling behavior in internal governance and the external
environment. Identify the pyramid equity structure, equity balance degree, board governance,
governance of the board of supervisors, four committee level, intermediary supervision,
marketization and the legal system of environmental eight impact factors for further analysis.
3. An empirical analysis on the ultimate controller’s tunneling behavior of family
businesses: the empirical analysis results based on the environment characteristics inside and
outside the enterprise and tunneling show that : (1)there is a non-linear relationship between
the control level and the tunneling behavior of ultimate controlling family businesses;
(2)separation of two rights shows a negative correlation with the ultimate control&39;s tunneling
but it is not significant; (3)for the equity balance, second to tenth of the shareholding ratio of
the largest shareholder and the tunnel behavior is not statistically significant, but the
shareholding ratio of institutional investors has a significant negative correlation; (4)for board
of directors, the proportion of independent directors is positively correlated with tunneling
behavior, but not significant; (5)for the board of supervisors governance, the scale of the
board is negatively correlated with the tunneling of the ultimate controller, but not significant;
(6)for four committee level, the number of the commission set up and tunneling have positive
significant correlation; (7)for external environment factors, the regional market level has a
significant negative impact on the tunneling, but intermediary supervision and the legal level
are failed to produce the ultimate controller’s tunneling inhibition.
4. Countermeasure research on the ultimate controller’s tunneling behavior of family
businesses: based on the empirical resea
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