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MBA硕士论文_公司治理_经理任职时间与研发投资DOC

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文本描述
摘要
技术创新对于企业乃至国家都有重要的意义。对于企业而言,技术创
新关乎企业长期的生死存亡,是企业长远战略得以实现的核心;而对于国
家,技术创新成为实现建设创新型国家目标的关键。企业的研发活动是技
术创新的重要反映,其核心的影响因素就是研发投资,所以通过开展对企
业研发投资的研究能够深入发掘优化企业创新效率的潜在机制。对研发投
资产生作用的因素有很多,其中公司治理是一个重要的影响因素。公司治
理不仅能够影响企业创新资源的分配,也对企业创新决策有重要的影响,
所以一直以来,公司治理一直是创新学者讨论的热点。企业的CEO是公
司治理的关键人物,也是研发决策的实际执行者,更是代理问题的核心,
对企业研发有着很重要的意义。本文通过将经理人“有限能力”和经理人
“投机主义”两种代理模型巧妙的结合,并且考虑了 CEO任职时间,将公
司治理对于研发的作用动态化,来研宄公司治理是如何对研发投资产生影
响的。文章在国内外大量文献和理论支持下,提出相应假说,并通过实证
方法加以研宄证明。考虑到高新技术行业研发强度大,研发投资普遍意义
上偏高,所以高新技术行业上市公司适合作为本文实证研究的对象。本文
选取中国高科技行业上市公司2010-2015年的数据集,控制研发投资的滞
后期的影响,制作动态面板数据,运用广义矩估计(Generalized method of
i
北京化工大学硕士学位论文
moments,GMM)的方法开展实证研宄,探索在不同的任职时间下,CEO
持股、CEO兼任与独立董事对企业研发投资的影响

本文发现在CEO任职的不同阶段,公司治理决策对于研发投资的影
响具有不同的效果。在CEO任职的初期,增加CEO持股会减少研发投资,
而在CEO任职的后期,增加CEO持股又可以很有效的促进研发。另外,
CEO与董事长是否兼任对企业研发的影响也存在随CEO任职时间而变化
的现象。在CEO任职的初期,CEO与董事长兼任能够促进企业的研发投
资,而在CEO任职的后期,CEO与董事长兼任会抑制研发投资。但是在
CEO任职后期,独立董事比例虽然和研发投资正相关,但是不显著,这
可能是因为在中国独立董事并不是绝对的“独立”。本研究提示企业政策制
定者及股东在制定公司治理策略时不能忽略对于企业微观治理结构的关
注,要重视CEO的任职时间,在合适的时间下采用恰当的公司治理策略
来促进研发投资,增强企业创新能力

关键词:任职时间,高新技术行业,公司治理,研发投资,广义矩估计
II
ABSTRACT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CEO TENURE
AND R&D INVESTMENT: CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES
IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
Technology innovation is the crucial element for the development of a
firm and even a country. To the firm view, technology innovation strategy is
associated with firm’s development in long run and is the core element to
succeed. For the country view, technology innovation is the key to achieve the
goal of building an innovative country. R&D activities of firms are important
reflection of technology innovation, and R&D investment is always the core
element of R&D activities. Therefore, we carry out this study on R&D
investment to find ways for firms to promote technology innovation and
increase firm5s innovation ability. There are many factors that play a role in
R&D investment, in which corporate governance is an important factor.
Corporate governance can not only affect the distribution of enterprises’
innovation resources, but also have an important impact on corporate
innovation decision-making, so corporate governance has always been a hot
topic for innovation scholars. CEO is not only the key figure of corporate
governance, but also the actual executor of R&D decision-making,
hi
北京化工大学硕士学位论文
furthermore CEO is the key of the principle-agent problem, and has important
effect on firms’ R&D activities. This paper examines how corporate
governance affects R&D investment by combining the limited competence
and managerial opportunism two agency models, and taking CEO tenure and
dynamic effect of corporate governance into consideration, under the support
of literature and theory at home and abroad, the paper puts forward the
corresponding hypothesis and proves it through the empirical method. Given
that the high strength of R&D in high-tech industry, and its generally high
level R&D investment, this paper chooses listed companies of high-tech
industry as the object of empirical research. This paper chooses the data of
China&39;s high-tech listed companies in 2010-2015, controls the impact of R&D
investment lag, makes dynamic panel data, and uses generalized method of
moments (GMM) to carry out empirical research to explore how CEO stock
options, CEO duality and independent directors affect corporate R&D
investment under different CEO tenure. This paper finds that the impact of
corporate governance decisions on R&D investment has different effects at
different stages of CEO tenure. In early stage of CEO tenure, CEO stock
ownership will reduce R&D investment, while in later CEO tenure, CEO
shareholding increase R&D investment and can be very effective in promoting
research and development. In addition, the CEO duality (CEO and chairman of
the board are same person) also has different influence on R&D investment in
IV
ABSTRACT
different stages of CEO tenure. In early stage of CEO tenure, CEO duality can
effectively promote R&D investment, while in the later stage of CEO tenure
will inhibit R&D investment. But in the later stage of CEO tenure,
independent director’s ratio and R & D investment are positively related, but
not significant. This may because the independent directors in China are not
absolutely “independent”. This study suggests that corporate policymakers and
shareholders cannot ignore the concerns of corporate micro-governance when
developing corporate governance strategies. Pay attention to CEO tenure and
adopt appropriate corporate governance strategies at the right time to promote
R&D investment and enhance business creativity.
KEY WORDS: CEO tenure; High-tech industry; Corporate governance;
R&D investment; GMM
v
目录
第一章引言 1
1.1研宄背景与意义 1
1.2研宄方法 3
1.3研究内容及思路 3
1.4创亲jf点 5
第二章相关理论及研究^2.1相关理论 7
2.1.1委托代理理论 7
2.1.2创新理论 11
2.1.3研发投资 12
2.2国内外相关研究综述2.2.1股权激励和研发投资2.2.2股权制衡和研发投资2.2.3董事会结构和研发投资2.2.4任期和研发投资2.2.5文献评述第三章研究设计3.1理论分析与研宄假设3.1.1在CEO任职的前后阶段,股权激励对研发投资的影响3.1.2在CEO任职的前后阶段,董事会独立性对研发投资的影响3.2样本数据和研究方法
22
3.2.1样本和数据 22
3.2.2变量设置和测量方法
23
VII
北京化工大学硕士学位论文
3.3模型建立及修正
25
第四章实证结果分析
29
4.1样本的描述性统计
29
4.2回归结果分析 32
4.3稳健性检验 36
第五章研究结论及政策建议
39
5.1研究结论 39
5.1.1 CEO任职不同阶段:CEO持股对于研发投资的影响
39
5.1.2 CEO任职不同阶段:CEO与董事长兼任对于研发投资的影响
40
5.2政策建议 41
5.3本文不足和未来展望
42
参考文献 45
麟 51
研究成果及发表的学术论文
53
作者和导师简介
55
VIII Contents
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction1.1 Study background and research significance1.2 Study method 3
1.3 Study contents and approach1A Innovation points 5
Chapter 2 Theories and literature review2.1 Correlation theories2.1.1 Principle-agency throry2.1.2 Innovation theory2.1.3 R&D investment2.2 Domestic and foreign research literature review2.2.1 Stock option and R&D2.2.2 Ownership structure and R&D2.2.3 Board independence and R&D2.2.4 CEO tenure and R&D2.2.5 Literature Review
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