Testimony
China and North Korea
Bolstering a Buffer or Hunkering Down in Northeast Asia
Andrew Scobell
CT-477
Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 8,2017.
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randChina and North Korea: Bolstering a Buffer or Hunkering Down in Northeast Asia
Testimony of Andrew Scobell1
The RAND Corporation2
Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
June 8,2017
he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has proved to be a near-constant
headache for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the early 1990s.3 Unlike
China’s relations across the Taiwan Strait with Taipei, which have improved appreciably
since 2008, and relations with Washington and Tokyo, which have their ups and downs but
remain cordial (if not exactly friendly), Beijing’s Pyongyang problem has not abated and appears
to be chronic. During the past two decades, China’s unruly neighbor has conducted a series of
nuclear tests and missile launches. Pyongyang’s provocations have come in swift succession: In
2010, it torpedoed a Republic of Korea naval vessel and shelled an island near the Korean
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), killing 48 South Korean military personnel and two civilians. In
subsequent years, it performed five nuclear tests and numerous missile launches. But this is not
all. To add insult to injury, Pyongyang executed North Korea’s key China interlocutor—Kim
Jong-un’s uncle, Chang Song-taek—in late 2013 and, more recently, assassinated Kim Jong-un’s
half-brother—who had been living under Beijing’s protection—while he was traveling in
Southeast Asia in early 2017. For the PRC, there has been no respite where the DPRK is
concerned.
This testimony addresses the following topics:
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as
representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
2 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make
communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,
nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.
3 This paragraph draws from Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad,“China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or
Recharge”
Parameters
, Vol.44, No.1, Spring 2014, pp.51–64. Indeed, PRC-DPRK relations have long been
bedeviled by tensions. See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack,
No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and
International Security
, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,2011.
TWhat China Wants
North Korea besmirches China’s prestige and threatens its national security.4 Beijing has
been accused of consorting with unsavory regimes around the world. For example, in the lead-up
to the 2008 Olympics, China found itself tarred as the bad guy in a humanitarian tragedy in
Darfur because of Beijing’s association with a Khartoum regime accused of perpetrating
atrocities. China craves the reputation of a responsible global citizen and a force for good in the
world. However, Pyongyang is not akin to Khartoum in Beijing’s eyes. After all, North Korea is
not some far-off, third-world state like Sudan. Rather, it is a radioactive Darfur on China’s
doorstep—a humanitarian disaster that is the subject of enormous international attention, led by a
repressive dictator armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Instability
immediately across the Yalu River directly threatens domestic stability in China’s heartland, if
only because of the specter of many hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Northeast
China. As a result, Beijing is ultra-sensitive to any hint of turmoil on the Korean Peninsula.
China’s approach to the continuing high drama in North Korea also takes place within the
broader context of Chinese assessments of the evolving overall balance of power in the wider
region. While Beijing remains gravely concerned about Pyongyang’s repeated provocations and
its expanding nuclear and ballistic missile programs, its greatest concern is reserved for U.S.
military presence and robust U.S. alliance partnerships in Northeast Asia. From Beijing’s point
of view, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs are most problematic in that they trigger
what China sees as threatening military responses by the United States and its allies. China’s
adamant opposition to the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in
South Korea is a manifestation of this abiding concern.
China’s key interests on the Korean Peninsula are routinely summed up as “three no’s”—no
war, no chaos, and no nukes (or “denuclearization”). While Beijing is undoubtedly sincere about
desiring a nonnuclear Korean Peninsula, maintaining peace and stability on China’s doorstep has
received a much higher ranking than denuclearization. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi
underscored these rankings when he stated in early 2014 that Korea was China’s “doorway” and
Beijing would not allow anyone to foment instability there. Since then, however, Chinese
thinking has evolved as PRC assessments of developments on the Korean Peninsula have altered.
Indeed, by 2015, Wang began to emphasize that, in Beijing’s view, all three interests have
become tightly interwoven and cannot be attained separately. In short, if lasting peace and
stability is to be attained on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization is essential. Speaking on
4 This paragraph draws from Scobell and Cozad,2014. DPRK actions also embarrass China’s leaders domestically,
and Chinese leaders are sensitive to Chinese public opinion on this issue. See Simon Shen,“The Hidden Face of
Comradeship: Popular Chinese Consensus on the DPRK and Its Implications for Beijing’s Policy.”
Journal of
Contemporary China
Vol.21, No.75,2012, pp.427-443.September 2015, Foreign Minister Wang stated,“Without ... denuclearization, stability on the
Peninsula and peace in Northeast Asia will be hardly attainable.”5
Since 2014, there has been a noticeable chill in Beijing-Pyongyang relations. China’s
response has not been to abandon North Korea; rather, Beijing has shifted gears from a strategy
of “bolstering the buffer” to one of hunkering down on Pyongyang. China has held resolutely to
its goal of preserving its North Korean buffer but adjusted tactics from actively funneling in a
wide range of resources designed to strengthen its fragile neighbor to stubbornly standing by its
truculent ally in the face of increasingly unfavorable conditions, growing international pressure,
and significant domestic criticism of Beijing’s policy toward Pyongyang.
Beijing