摘 要
随着信息技术的快速发展和科技的不断进步，废旧电器电子产品迅速增加，其中富
含很多金、铜等贵重金属，具有很高的回收利用价值，废弃电子产品的非法拆解不但污
染环境，对人类健康也有着极其重要的影响。因此加强对废弃电子产品的回收利用，将
有利于发展循环经济，创建节约型社会，对于减少污染，保障人类的健康，都具有重要
意义。随着专家学者对生产者责任延伸制(Extended producer responsibility, EPR)制度的
关注，企业和政府也纷纷予以重视，作为一项新的环境政策，EPR 要求政府、社会和企
业的共同努力，虽然 EPR 从字面上说是由生产商负责，但是在实际生活中，仅仅依靠
生产商进行回收处理是难以实现的，其中，零售商和消费者也同时负有对电子废弃物回
收的义务，并将其转交给生产商或指定的回收企进行处理

在上述 EPR 背景下，我国也参考国外的 EPR 相关立法，明确规定了电子废弃物的
回收责任，即以生产者或以生产者为核心的一系列产品参与者均负有回收的义务。基于
此，本文在专家学者研究的基础上，结合相关法律法规的制定，考虑了生产商和零售商
共同分担回收责任的问题进行了一系列的分析阐述，其中，针对生产商委托零售商回收
时零售商的自利行为，进而做了更加深入的研究：
（1）考虑零售商隐藏回收量的自利行为下的激励契约设计。在生产商委托零售商
回收电子废弃物过程中，引入零售商的自利行为，建立零售商自利时生产商与零售商的
合作契约，分析并阐述了零售商存在自利行为时对生产商激励合同设计的影响。比较分
析了零售商不存在自利行为和存在自利行为时的激励差别，进而分析了零售商隐藏回收
量自利行为时，各相关参数变动对契约参数的影响

（2）考虑零售商虚减回收目标的自利行为时的激励研究。在零售商虚减回收目标
下，建立生产商的委托代理模型，分析了多期契约中零售商的事前回收操纵行为，即在
回收计划阶段通过围绕回收目标值的确定，制定有效的激励措施。最后分析了零售商的
这一行为对零售商的回收操纵行为的影响和回收努力的影响

（3）基于零售商逆向选择的信息甄别研究。由于生产商和零售商在回收过程中的
信息不对称，零售商易受自利动机的驱使，出现隐藏回收量和虚减目标的行为，所以为II
了减少零售商出现的逆向选择问题的发生，进一步研究了逆向选择情况下生产商对零售
商的最优激励合同问题，给出了能够诱导零售商如实报告其真实回收能力的逆向选择模
型，生产商可以通过零售商在设计契约的选择上，甄别零售商的信息

（4）约束零售商自利行为的实施策略研究。从参数分析着手，针对生产商委托零
售商进行回收的相关问题进行了讨论，并根据各个参数的相关性，提出了相对的策略建
议。主要从非正规回收企业的准入、零售商的回收成本、生产商设置的回收目标适应系
数、生产商对零售商的信息甄别和选择上、线性函数激励的完善方面、生产商对零售商
的激励和监督强度方面以及政府提高参与程度等方面提出了相关策略

关键词：电子废弃物，自利行为，虚减目标，逆向选择，激励III
ABSTRACT
With the rapid development of information technology and the progress of science and
technology, the waste of electric and electronic products increase rapidly,which are rich in a lot of gold,
copper and other precious metals.At the same time,most of them have the very high value of
recycling.Waste electric and electronic products not only pollute the environment, but also has the
extremely important influence to the human health.Therefore,strengthening the recycling of waste
electronic products will be conducive to the development of circular economy and to create a
conservation-minded society.It has important significance not only to reduce pollution, but also to protect
human health.With the coming up with of the producer responsibility extension (Extended producer
responsibility, EPR) system, enterprises and government have also attach importance to it.As a new
environmental policy, EPR requires the joint efforts of the government, society and the enterprises.In the
European Union, the main representative of the EPR system including the European parliament and the
European council on automobiles (ELV) directive,and European parliament and the council on scrap
directive to electrical and electronic equipment, in terms of recycling practices, the European has set up a
producer responsibility organization (PRO). The essence of the PRO is that producers create a special
cooperation mechanism or government set up specialized recycling group,to resolve the recycling problem
of the waste electronic products.In Japan, the main responsibility of the EPR system mainly consists of
producers, retailers and consumers.While in real life, it is difficult to achieve the target only relying on
producers for recycling. The retailers and consumers also have the obligation to recycling of the electronic
wastes.IV
At the background of the EPR, our government also defined the electronic waste recycling
responsibility, that is the manufacturer or producer as the core of a series of products should have the
obligation to recycle. Based on this, this article consider the recovery producers and retailers share the
responsibility of a series of analysis.Finally, this article do the further research when the retailers have
self-interest behavior.
(1) Incentive contract design for the retailers self-interested behavior of hidden recycled. In the
process of recovery of electronic waste, introducing the self-interest behavior of retailers,to establish a
cooperation contract model.Then the author analyzes and expounds how the behavior of retailers’
self-interested affects producers’ incentive contract design. Last giving a Comparative analysis that there is
no self-interest behavior and presence of self-interest behavior motivation, the different influence of
related parameters on contract parameters.
(2) A motivation research for retailers’ decreased recycling target behavior. Under the retailers
decreasing collection targets, the author sets up a model of the principal-agent .Then,the author analyzes
retailers’ prior recycling manipulation in the period in the contract.That is to say,the author makes an
effective incentive around the determination of the target. In the end, the author gives a analysis about the
retailer's behavior influence on retailer's recycling manipulation and recycling efforts.
(3) An information screening study based on the retailers' adverse selection. Because there is
asymmetry information between producers and retailers in the process of recycling, retailers are susceptible
to driven by self-interests.In order to reduce the occurrence of adverse selection problem, the author makes
a further study about incentive contract on the adverse selection case. Finally,a adverse selection model ofV
real recovery ability is given.So the producers can identify the retailer's information by retailers’ choice on
the design contract.
(4) A strategy research about constraint retailers’ self-interest behavior.At first,the author
discusses the related problems in view of the producers to entrust retailers recycle.According to the
correlation of various parameters,the author put forward some strategies mainly from the informal
recycling enterprises access to recycling costs, manufacturers and retailers set recycling target of adaptation
coefficient, manufacturer information on identifying and choice for retailers, the improvement of the linear
function incentive, producers incentive and supervision strength of retailers and government aspects of
improving the level of participation.
KEY WORDS:Electronic waste, Self-interest behavior, Decreased the goal, Adverse selection, IncentiveVII
目录
摘 要.......I
ABSTRACT ..... III
目录.....VII
第一章 绪论......1
1.1 研究背景及意义..... 1
1.1.1 选题背景....... 1
1.1.2 研究意义....... 2
1.2 国内外研究现状..... 2
1.2.1 闭环供应链中回收处理参与主体的研究... 3
1.2.2 回收处理参与主体的激励机制研究........... 4
1.2.3 文献评述....... 5
1.3 本文研究内容、方法和创新点..... 5
1.3.1 研究内容....... 5
1.3.2 研究方法....... 6
1.3.3 本文创新点... 7
第二章 相关理论概述..9
2.1 供应链相关理论..... 9
2.1.1 逆向物流概述........... 9
2.1.2 闭环供应链概述..... 10
2.2 循环经济理论....... 11
2.2.1 循环经济理论的概念和原则......... 11
2.2.2 逆向物流与循环经济......... 11
2.3 委托代理理论....... 12
第三章 零售商自利行为下的激励契约设计15
3.1 问题描述和基本假设....... 15VIII
3.1.1 零售商负责回收的背景描述......... 15
3.1.2 基本假设和变量定义......... 16
3.2 模型设计... 17
3.2.1 零售商无自利行为下的激励契约设计..... 17
3.2.2 零售商自利行为下的激励契约设计......... 18
3.3 比较分析和小结... 20
3.3.1 比较分析..... 20
3.3.2 数据模拟和本章小结......... 21
第四章 零售商虚减回收目标时的激励研究25
4.1 背景及基本假设... 25
4.1.1 背景. 25
4.1.2 基本假设和变量定义......... 26
4.2 建立模型和分析... 28
4.2.1 建立模型和求解..... 28
4.2.2 结果分析..... 29
4.2.3 算例分析..... 32
4.3 本章小结... 37
第五章 基于零售商逆向选择的信息甄别研究........39
5.1 基本假设和模型建立....... 40
5.1.1 基本假设说明......... 40
5.1.2 信息对称下建立模型......... 41
5.2 逆向选择下的模型建立... 42
5.3 结果分析... 44
5.4 本章小结... 45
第六章 约束零售商自利行为的实施策略研究........47
6.1 生产商委托零售商回收过程中的相关问题分析........... 47
6.2 策略建议... 48
6.3 本章小结... 50
第七章 结论和展望....53IX
7.1 研究的主要结论... 53
7.2 研究局限与展望... 54
7.2.1 研究局限..... 54
7.2.2 研究展望..... 55
参考文献..........57
致 谢....61
攻读学位期间的科研成果......63
独 创 性 声 明..........65
关于论文使用授权的说明......651
。。。。。。以上简介无排版格式，详细内容请下载查看