摘要
随着环境问题的日益突出、资源稀缺压力的增大，国家建立许多相应的法律
规范。但是在中国现阶段，由于受技术、成本、收益等多方因素的影响，多数电
子电器生产商不愿自主进行家电回收工作，使废旧电子电器回收结果差强人意

所以本文主要从生产商出发，通过鼓励和监督家电生产商主动回收家电，实现从
源头解决资源浪费和环境问题

本文首先采用层次分析法，对生产商实施家电回收的影响因素（回收利润、
回收成本、财政补贴、环境效益）进行分析，并探索因素之间的相互联系。然后，
通过借助演化博弈论理论，考虑了四大因素的制约作用，构建了政府、通过互联
网方式进行家电回收生产商
N 、通过传统方式进行家电回收生产商
N 博弈模型，以及政府、生产商（通过互联网方式回收生产商
N 和通过传统方式回收生产商
N ）、居民三方博弈模型，揭示了在不同模型假设参数下，生产商的最优回收模
式选择，同时通过对我国废旧电器回收现状进行研究，为政府、居民的决策提供
建议

研究结果表明：回收利润、回收成本、财政补贴、环境效益四大因素是相互
影响、相互制约的。生产商考虑到回收利润、回收成本等变量，会优先选择互联
网方式进行回收。其次，在政府、通过互联网方式进行家电回收生产商
N 、通过传统方式进行家电回收生产商
N 博弈模型中，生产商会在回收利润、成本和财政
补贴主要影响下，选择传统回收方式参与回收。最后，政府、生产商（通过互联
网回收生产商和通过传统方式回收生产商）、居民三方博弈模型中，生产商和居
民会更倾向于选择传统方式进行家电回收

关键词：生产商；回收模式；博弈模型；逆向供应链；废旧家电- ii -
ABSTRACT
With the environmental problems have become increasingly prominent,
increasing pressure on scarce resources, the establishment of the state of many
relevant laws and regulations. But in China at the present stage, due to technical, cost,
income and other various factors influence, most of the electronic electric appliance
manufacturers do not want to independent home appliance recycling industry and
trade, make the waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling results are
unsatisfactory. So this paper mainly from the manufacturer of, by encouraging and
supervision home appliance manufacturers take the initiative to home appliance
recycling, from the source to solve the waste of resources and environmental issues.
This paper uses the analytic hierarchy process, influencing factors of
implementing recycling electrical appliances manufacturers (recycling profit, cost
recovery, financial subsidies, environmental benefits) are analyzed, and to explore the
relationship between the factors. Then, by means of evolutionary game theory,
restricting the role of four major factors considered, constructing the government,
home appliance recovery of manufacturers by way of the Internet, the home appliance
recycling manufacturers game model, through the traditional way and the government,
producers (manufacturers and recovery through the Internet through traditional
recycling manufacturers) three party game model, residents, revealed in the different
model parameters, select the optimal recovery mode manufacturers, at the same time
Study on the recycling of waste electrical current situation of China's government,
offer suggestions residents decisions.
The results show that the return of profit, cost recovery, financial subsidies,
environmental benefits of the four factors are mutual influence and restrict each other.
Producers consider recycling profit, cost recovery and other variables, will choose the
Internet for recycling. Secondly, in the government, home appliance recycling
manufacturers through the Internet, the home appliance recycling manufacturer of
game model through the traditional way, the production cost and profit recovery in the
chamber of Commerce, mainly under the influence of financial subsidies, choose to
participate in the recovery of traditional recovery methods. Finally, the government,- iii -
producer (through the Internet and through the traditional way of recycling
manufacturers recycling manufacturers), residents of three party game model,
producers and residents tend to choose the traditional appliance recycling.
Keywords：Producer ；Recycling model ；Game model ；Reverse supply China ；
Waste household appliances湖南科技大学硕士学位论文
目 录
摘要.......i
ABSTRACT.....ii
第一章 绪论.1
1.1 研究背景.......1
1.2 研究目的和研究意义......... 2
1.2.1 研究目的.......2
1.2.2 研究意义.......2
1.3 研究内容和研究方法......... 3
1.3.1 研究内容.......3
1.3.2 研究方法.......3
1.4 论文的创新点........5
第二章 相关理论基础及研究综述....7
2.1 相关理论概述.......... 7
2.1.1 逆向供应链...7
2.1.2 生产商责任延伸制..7
2.1.3 演化博弈理论.......... 8
2.2 废旧电子产品回收的实践处理分析........9
2.2.1 国外废旧电子产品回收政策.........9
2.2.2 国内废旧电子产品回收政策...... 10
2.3 生产商回收处理废旧电子产品的研究综述.....11
2.3.1 国外文献研究现状11
2.3.2 国内文献研究现状13
2.4 述评与小节.15
第三章 生产商回收模式分类及影响因素分析.17
3.1 生产商回收模式主要分类...........17
3.1.1 生产商回收处理模式....... 17
3.1.2 生产商联盟回收模式....... 18
3.2 生产商回收模式影响因素分析..19
3.2.1 生产商回收模式选择的主要影响因素.19
3.2.2 基于层次分析法的生产商回收模式选择.........20
3.2.3 结果分析与探讨....25
第四章 生产商回收模式选择的博弈模型构建.27
4.1 政府和不同生产商博弈模型建立与分析.........27
4.1.1 模型假设与参数设立....... 27
4.1.2 政府和不同生产商静态博弈模型分析.28
4.1.3 政府和不同生产商动态博弈模型分析.29
4.1.3.1 政府和不同生产商稳定性分析...........30
4.1.4 结果分析与探讨....33
4.2 政府、生产商、居民三方博弈模型建立与分析........35
4.2.1 模型假设与参数分析....... 35
4.2.2 政府、生产商、居民三方稳定性分析.36
4.2.3 结果分析与探讨....39
第五章 结论与展望........43
5.1 研究结论.....43
5.2 展望..43
参考文献......45
致 谢..47
附 录 A：攻读学位期间发表的学术论文...........49
附 录 B：层次分析法调查问卷.......51
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